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INTRODUCTION 
One of the challenges facing international legal theorists is to under-
stand the extent of recent changes in international law and relations. A 
burgeoning amount of scholarship exists that grapples with the declin-
ing relevance of territoriality1 and state sovereignty,2 the impact of glo-
balization,3 and the migration of law across borders.4 Scholars have si-
milarly debated the role that non-state actors play in international law,5 
                                                          
1. See, e.g., Thomas J. Biersteker, State, Sovereignty and Territory, in HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 157 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002); Kal Raustiala, The Evolu-
tion of Territoriality: International Relations and American Law, in TERRITORIALITY AND 
CONFLICT IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 9 (Miles Kahler & Barbara F. Walter eds., 2006); John 
G. Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 
INT’L ORG. 139 (1993); Saskia Sassen, Territory and Territoriality in a Global Economy, 15 
INT’L SOC. 372 (2000). For a recent law and geography perspective, see John Agnew, Sovereignty 
Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics, 95 ANNALS ASS’N 
AM. GEOGRAPHERS 437 (2005). 
2. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International 
Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959 (2000) (describing how globalization has presented a challenge to 
state sovereignty); Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty 
in International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 141 (2005); see 
also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); STEPHEN D. KRASNER, 
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999); SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? 
SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996). 
3. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
167 (1999); Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 492–511 (2005); Shampa Biswas, W(h)ither the Nation-state? National 
and State Identity in the Face of Fragmentation and Globalisation, 16 GLOBAL SOC’Y 175, 182–
85 (2002). See generally Miles Kahler & David A. Lake, Globalization and Governance, in 
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION 1 (Miles Kahler 
& David A. Lake eds., 2003). 
4. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and 
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating 
Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing In-
ternational Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487 (2005). 
5. See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae 
and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 235, 235–36 
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including the salience of international institutions,6 and the importance 
of transnational processes7 and global networks.8 Intimately connected 
to all these debates is another phenomenon, which the changes in the in-
ternational system foster: the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws by 
U.S. courts9 to solve transboundary disputes.10 
These changes have played out with pronounced force in the interna-
tional environmental law context. For many environmentalists, the tradi-
tional view of environmental lawmaking as the exclusive business of 
nation states has become anachronistic.11 In a fast-paced global econo-
                                                                                                                                      
(2002); Julie Mertus, Considering Nonstate Actors in the New Millennium: Toward Expanded 
Participation in Norm Generation and Norm Application, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 537, 552–
56 (2002); Philippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 527, 529 (2001); Peter J. Spiro, Nonstate Actors in Global Politics, 92 
AM. J. INT’L L. 808 (1998). 
6. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 
6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 841, 857–62 (2003); Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institu-
tions and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1946 
(1997). 
7. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996). See 
generally OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND POLITICS (2005) (describing various approaches to international law).  
8. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 108–27 (2004); Robert O. 
Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 
WORLD POL. 39, 41 (1974) (describing the development of transgovernmental networks as a driv-
ing force behind international policy); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Coopera-
tion: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 
(2002).  
9. In recent years, U.S. courts have applied extraterritorially a wide range of domestic laws. 
Philip B. Dye et al., International Litigation, 40 INT’L LAW. 275, 299–303 (2006) (listing cases in 
the past year where U.S. courts have “considered extraterritoriality in disputes involving the fed-
eral habeas corpus statute, as well as intellectual property, antitrust, securities, employment, dis-
abilities, tort claims, criminal law, and immigration issues.”). See generally Christopher A. Why-
tock, Transnational Law, Domestic Courts and Global Governance (forthcoming 2007) (on file 
with author). 
10. See Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty: U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of International 
Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 631–39 (2002) (describing how U.S. courts have sought to widen 
their international influence through shifts in doctrines such as personal jurisdiction, forum non 
conveniens, comity, and choice of law). See generally GEORGE A. BERMANN, TRANSNATIONAL 
LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL (2003); GARY B. BORN & PETER RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (2006); VED. P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS (2003).  
11. See Michael M’Gonigle, Between Globalism and Territoriality: The Emergence of an In-
ternational Constitution and the Challenge of Ecological Legitimacy, 15 CAN. J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 159, 168 (2002); see also Russell A. Miller, Surprising Parallels Between Trail 
Smelter and the Global Climate Change Regime, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 168 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell 
A. Miller eds., 2006) (explaining that the rise of “nonstate actors suggests a new world order in 
which the nation state’s Westphalian prerogative is increasingly suspect”); cf. Duncan B. Hollis, 
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my, international environmental treaties are often too cumbersome and 
sluggish to address environmental challenges.12 From climate change 
litigation,13 to transboundary pollution,14 to shared management of natu-
ral resources,15 international environmental lawmaking is increasingly 
occurring at the subnational level in U.S. courts.16 Some American envi-
ronmentalists cheer these developments, perceiving them to encourage 
an environmental race to the top.17 Other scholars declare the “dawn of 
a new era” of transboundary environmental litigation.18 
                                                                                                                                      
Why State Consent Still Matters—Nonstate Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of Inter-
national Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 137 (2005). 
12. See, e.g., Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways To Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 259, 259 (1992) (stating that the treaty process causes international environmental law 
to be “slow, cumbersome, expensive, uncoordinated and uncertain”); James Gustave Speth, Inter-
national Environmental Law: Can it Deal with the Big Issues?, 28 VT. L. REV. 779, 787 (2004) 
(describing the cumbersome treaty process); cf. Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict of Laws, Globaliza-
tion, and Cosmopolitan Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1105, 1134–35 (2005) (praising transna-
tional common-law adjudication because “treaties…are cumbersome and slow to adjust to chang-
ing technologies or social conditions”). 
13. For a discussion of subnational regimes and climate change litigation, see ADJUDICATING 
CLIMATE CHANGE: SUB-NATIONAL, NATIONAL, AND SUPRA-NATIONAL APPROACHES (William 
C.G. Burns & Hari. M. Osofsky eds., forthcoming 2007); Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of 
Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1789 (2005); see also Symposium, The Role of State Attorneys General in National Envi-
ronmental Policy, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 403, 404 (2005) (describing state Attorneys’ General 
filing of innovative lawsuits to combat global climate change). 
14 . See, e.g., Noah D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution: Harmonizing International and Do-
mestic Law, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681 (2007); Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Déjà Vu: 
Extraterritoriality, International Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-
U.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363 (2005). See generally 
TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11 (exploring the changing nature 
of state responses to transboundary harm). 
15. A good example is contained in the December 2005 Great Lakes Water Resources Com-
pact and Agreement. See generally Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Inter-
state Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405 (2006) (describing 
the citizen’s suit provisions of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Com-
pact and Agreement); Austen L. Parrish, Mixed Blessings: The Great Lakes Compact and Agree-
ment, the IJC, and International Dispute Resolution, MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (ex-
plaining how the agreement between eight states and two provinces moves Great Lakes 
management to the subnational level, in part by permitting citizen’s suits).  
16. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1509–
45 (3d ed. 2007) (describing the extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental statutes); see 
also Martha A. Candiello, The Extraterritorial Reach of Environmental Laws, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 
1235 (1997); Paul E. Hagen, The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Environmental Law, 46 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 151 (2005); Anna D. Stasch, Arc Ecology v. United States Department of the Air Force: 
Extending the Extraterritorial Reach of Domestic Environmental Law, 36 ENVTL. L. 1065 (2006). 
17. See Michael J. Robinson-Dorn, The Trail Smelter: Is What’s Past Prologue? EPA Blazes 
a New Trail for CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 315–19 (2006) (arguing that domestic law-
suits can create a race to the top in environmental regulation, and encouraging the extraterritorial 
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As broad as this scholarship is, however, in some respects it remains 
undeveloped. First, the existing scholarship often speaks in abstract 
theoretical terms or in broad generalities, while failing to explain how 
domestic law can practically address transboundary challenges. The 
scholarship at times ignores context and nuance; generically proposing 
domestic litigation is one thing, explaining how a suit in a particular 
dispute might succeed is another.19 Second, the scholarship is United 
States-centric. Missing from the conversation is an understanding of 
how trends in international law and relations are playing out beyond 
U.S. borders.20 Will other countries’ citizens seek in their courts to ap-
ply their own domestic environmental laws extraterritorially? If so, how 
will this impact American interests? This Article will jump headfirst in-
to this scholarship gap. It does so by focusing on an unlikely flashpoint: 
the U.S.-Canada relationship. 
                                                                                                                                      
application of domestic environmental laws); see also Joel A. Gallob, Birth of the North Ameri-
can Transboundary Environmental Plaintiff: Transboundary Pollution and the 1979 Draft Treaty 
for Equal Access Remedy, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 85 (1991) (arguing for court-based solutions 
to transboundary pollution problems); cf. Noah D. Hall, Bilateral Breakdown: U.S.-Canada Pol-
lution Disputes, 21 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 18, 23 (2006) ( “Ideally, we could allow domestic 
litigation to resolve these disputes in a way that strengthens, not undermines, the United States-
Canada relationship.”); Hall, supra note 14, at 723–736 (describing how domestic litigation can 
be used to address transboundary pollution). 
18. Randall S. Abate, Dawn of a New Era in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Envi-
ronmental Statutes: A Proposal for an Integrated Judicial Standard Based on the Continuum of 
Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 87 (2006) (recognizing but criticizing the extraterritorial appli-
cation of law); see also Gallob, supra note 17, at 85; Rachel Kastenberg, Note, Closing the Lia-
bility Gap in the International Transboundary Water Pollution Regime–Using Domestic Law to 
Hold Polluters Accountable: A Case Study of Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Ltd., 7 OR. REV. INT’L 
L. 322 (2005). 
19. Attorneys asserting Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) claims have first-hand knowledge of 
the disconnect between theory and practice. Although academics have encouraged those claims 
for human rights violations, the number of successful claims has been limited. See Barnali 
Choudhury, Beyond the Alien Tort Claims Act: Alternative Approaches to Attributing Liability to 
Corporations for Extraterritorial Abuses, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 43, 44 (2005) (explaining 
that “individuals using the ATCA to hold MNCs accountable for human rights violations have not 
met with considerable success”); Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of 
Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 428–29 n.158 (2005) (explaining 
that “numerous suits have been filed against MNCs under the Alien Tort Claims Act…although 
to date with limited success”).  
20. Outside the environmental context, a few articles exist. See, e.g., David J. Feeney, The 
European Commission’s Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Corporate Mergers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 425 (2002) (describing the European context); David J. Gerber, The Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 756 (1983) (Germany); Won-Ki Kim, The 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law and its Adoption in Korea, 7 SING. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 368 (2003) (Korea). 
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Transboundary problems straddling the 49th parallel have recently 
cast a pall over the relationship between the world’s closest political and 
economic allies. This Article forecasts that, in light of recent border-
tensions and the apparent American willingness to extraterritorially ap-
ply U.S. laws, Canadians increasingly will explore the extraterritorial 
application of their own domestic laws to remedy transboundary envi-
ronmental harm.21 The Article explores this argument through the lens 
of a particularly contentious cross-border issue—the transboundary air 
pollution that the province of Ontario suffers from U.S. stationary pollu-
tion sources. Canadian diplomatic attempts to resolve this longstanding 
pollution problem have failed. And, with recent studies showing that 
U.S. pollution causes yearly health and environmental costs in Ontario 
exceeding $5.2 billion,22 Canadians may be less willing to overlook the 
problem in anticipation of a cooperative solution.23 
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, the Article provides 
context: it describes the deterioration of U.S.-Canadian cooperation and 
the increasingly common rejection of bilateral institutions and treaties to 
solve cross-border disputes. In so doing, the Article canvases several of 
the most important and recent transboundary cases between Canada and 
the United States. Part II places the focus on a particular irritant in U.S.-
                                                          
21. Noah Hall has noted the issue without reaching it: “If American citizens can protect them-
selves from Canadian pollution using citizen suits under U.S. law in U.S. courts, should not the 
Canadian federal government also give its citizens the same opportunity to protect themselves 
from American pollution using Canadian domestic laws in Canadian courts?” Hall, supra note 14, 
at 738 n.338; see also Abate, supra note 18, at 133 (asking whether the “floodgates of litigation” 
will open with suits “hauling U.S. businesses into Canadian courts for the effects of polluting ac-
tivities that originate in the United States”); Marcia Valiante, “Welcomed Participants” or “Envi-
ronmental Vigilantes”? The CEPA Environmental Protection Action and the Role of Citizen Suits 
in Federal Environmental Law, 25 DALHOUSIE L.J. 81 (2002) (exploring the desirability of citi-
zen suits under Canadian law). 
22. See Press Release, Ont. Ministry of the Env’t, High Profile Transboundary Air Pollution 
Committees Tackle Ontario’s Shared Air Issues (June 21, 2006), available at http:// 
www.ene.gov.on.ca/en/news/2006/062102.pdf (noting that U.S. pollution causes more than $5.2 
billion in health and environmental damages); see also Press Release, Ont. Ministry of the Env’t, 
Report on Transboundary Air Pollution in Ontario (June 16, 2005), available at 
http://www.ene.gov.en/news/2005/061601mb.pdf; Press Release, Ont. Ministry of the Env’t, 
Support for Ontario Filing Comments with the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(Feb. 17 2006), available at http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/en/news/2006/021701mb2.pdf (listing 
damages caused by transboundary pollution). 
23. See Laurel Broten, Minister of Env’t, Remarks at a Media Briefing on Transboundary Air 
in Washington, D.C. (May 10, 2006), available at 
http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/en/about/minister/speeches/051006.php (describing the problem of 
transboundary air pollution as one “that kills Canadians and Americans without prejudice” and “a 
problem that we cannot ignore”). 
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Canada relations: the problems facing Ontario from U.S. pollution and 
Canada’s failure to find lasting and comprehensive diplomatic solutions. 
In Part III, the Article suggests that the province of Ontario in particular 
likely will explore enacting and then using extraterritorial laws to reme-
dy transboundary harm when traditional dispute mechanisms prove inef-
fective. The Article explains how changes in law and science have 
created a receptive environment for this kind of transboundary lawsuit 
brought in a foreign court against American polluters. Particularly, it 
explains how the province of Ontario could enact a statute that would 
enable transboundary litigation to proceed. Lastly, in Part IV, the Ar-
ticle briefly explores the normative question of whether international 
environmental lawmaking through domestic litigation is a positive de-
velopment. In answering that question, the Article ends on an ambiva-
lent note. In the near term, transboundary civil litigation is a viable and 
useful tool to address serious cross-border harm – a tool that Canadians 
should use.  Over the long term, however, domestic transboundary liti-
gation will likely prove a poor substitute for the bilateral cooperation 
and effective federal involvement that until recently characterized Can-
ada-U.S. relations.   
I. CONTEXT: THE U.S.-CANADA RELATIONSHIP 
Given the trade and economic integration between Canada and the 
United States, transboundary environmental disputes are hardly surpris-
ing. Until recently, however, Canada and the United States have been 
particularly effective at resolving these disputes diplomatically or 
through international or bilateral dispute resolution processes. But the 
once unparalleled cooperation between the two nations—although still 
strong—appears to be on a decline. A context exists where Canadians 
are willing more than ever to explore unilateral, extraterritorial solu-
tions. 
A. A History of Dispute Avoidance and Peaceful Resolution 
The United States and Canada’s ability to cooperate and peacefully 
resolve differences has been unique. Internationally, the partnership be-
tween the two countries is admired: “[I]t has neither precedent nor equal 
in the international system today.”24 So strong has been the cooperation 
that the relationship is often described in romantic terms: 
                                                          
24. KARI ROBERTS, A CONTINENTAL DIVIDE? RETHINKING THE CANADA-U.S. BORDER 
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[I]n a world in which it sometimes seems that each country is at 
odds with every other, the Canada-U.S. relationship has some-
times looked like an island of tranquility in a sea of conflict...the 
idea that Canada and the U.S. had somehow developed a magic 
formula for achieving a happy international marriage....25 
Traditionally then, a strong preference has existed for the two neighbors 
to resolve their differences through diplomacy rather than through for-
mal legal action.26 
Cooperation has been, in many ways, essential because Canada and 
the United States are strikingly interdependent. U.S.-Canada trade in 
services, cross-border investments, and tourism surpasses $42 billion 
yearly.27 In fact, the trading relationship represents the largest flow of 
income, goods, and services in the history of the world: a staggering 
$1.2 billion U.S. dollars daily.28 The United States exports more to Can-
                                                                                                                                      
RELATIONSHIP 3 (Canada West Foundation 2006), available at http://www.cwf.ca/files/ 
A%20continental%20Divide.pdf. 
25. Richard B. Bilder, When Neighbors Quarrel: Canada-U.S. Dispute-Settlement Experience 
3–4 (Inst. for Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 8:4, May 1987); see also Michael Hart, Disarm-
ing the “Undefended Border”: Reflections on the Rationale for a Canada-U.S. Customs Union, in 
BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP: THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 126 (Mor-
dechai Kreinin ed., 2000) (quoting James Eayres that “[n]atural frontiers exist between nations, 
but the border between Canada and the United States is not one of them,” and Sir Winston Chur-
chill that the Canada-U.S. border is “guarded only by neighbourly respect and honorable obliga-
tions”). 
26. See, e.g., Erik B. Wang, Adjudication of Canada-United States Disputes, 19 CAN. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 158, 159 (1981) (citing Marcel Cadieux, former Ambassador of Canada to the United 
States); Sixth Annual Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law, Ottawa, Octo-
ber 21, 1977, 1 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 19 (1978); see also Richard B. Bilder, Controlling Great Lakes 
Pollution: A Study in United States–Canadian Environmental Cooperation, 70 MICH. L. REV. 
469, 480–84 (1971–1972) (describing the history of cooperation in context of the Great Lakes). 
27. See Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Sec’y of State for W. Hemisphere Affairs, Remarks to 
the Economic Club of Toronto about Trade and the Canada-U.S. Border (Mar. 29, 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/31949 htm (describing the trade partnership); see also 
The Embassy of the United States of America, Ottowa, Canada, Canada-United States Relations 
(Jan. 2007), http://ottawa.usembassy.gov/content/content.asp?section=can_usa&subsection1 
=general&document=canusarelations (explaining that Canada and the United States have the 
world's largest bilateral trading relationship and that Canada is the leading export market for 39 of 
the 50 U.S. states). 
28. See Press Release, Washington Canadian Embassy, Canada Largest Supplier of Oil to the 
U.S.: Canada Leads Saudi Arabia and Mexico (Mar. 28, 2005), available at 
http://geo.international.gc.ca/can-am/Washington/trade_and_investment/energy rel050328-en.asp 
(“Two-way trade between Canada and the United States has more than doubled in value since the 
signing of the NAFTA in 1994. We are each other's largest trading partner, with US $1.2 billion 
in trade now crossing the Canada-US border every single day.”); see also Robert Hage, The New 
Reality in Canada/U.S. Relations: Reconciling Security and Economic Interests and the “Smart 
Border Declaration,” 29 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 21, 24 (2003) (explaining that over two billion Canadian 
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ada than it does to Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and China, com-
bined.29 But the interdependence is not limited to trade. More than 200 
million border crossings each year occur between the two countries,30 
and ninety percent of all Canadians live within a hundred miles of the 
U.S. border.31 The countries also share numerous environmental chal-
lenges.32 These challenges include maintaining air and water quality, 
and the management of other shared resources, such as migratory birds 
and wildlife.33 Along the almost 5,000 mile border are also hundreds of 
                                                                                                                                      
dollars in trade crosses the border daily). For popular perceptions of the amount of trade between 
the two countries, see WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada-United_States_Free_Trade_Agreement (last vi-
sited Apr. 10, 2007). 
29. See Washington Canadian Embassy, The Canada-U.S. Trade and Investment Partnership, 
http://geo.international.gc.ca/can-am/washington/trade_and_investment/trade_partnership-en.asp 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
30. See Noriega, supra note 27; see also MICHAEL HART & WILLIAM DYMOND, COMMON 
BORDERS, SHARED DESTINIES: CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND DEEPENING INTEGRATION 7 
(2001), available at http://www.carleton.ca/ctpl/pdf/papers/cdaus.pdf (noting the degree of inte-
gration, including that some 200 million individual border crossings occur each year); Hage, su-
pra note 28, at 24 (“Fifty thousand peoples cross the border every day; and this is the statistic that 
I find so overwhelming, 200 million border crossings by people every year.”); cf. COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, CREATING A NORTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY: CHAIRMEN’S STATEMENT 5 
(2005), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/NorthAmerica_TF_eng.pdf (describing the 
degree of integration and noting that “[i]n 2005, the borders between Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States [were] crossed almost 400 million times”). 
31. See CIA, THE WORLD FACT BOOK, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ca html; see also STATISTICS 
CAN., 2001 CENSUS ANALYSIS SERIES: A PROFILE OF CANADIAN POPULATION–WHERE WE LIVE 
1 (2001) (charting Canadian population trends). 
32. See, e.g., COMM'N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, THE NORTH AMERICAN MOSAIC: A 
STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT REPORT 2–4 (2002), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF//soe_en.pdf (describing the many North American transboundary 
environmental challenges). From a Canadian perspective, having a much smaller economy means 
that U.S. environmental laws impact Canadians significantly. As Pierre Elliot Trudeau colorfully 
described it over thirty years ago, living next to the United States is “like sleeping with an ele-
phant. No matter how friendly and even-tempered is the beast…one is affected by every twitch 
and grunt.” Pierre Elliot Trudeau, then-Prime Minister of Can., address to the National Press Club 
(Mar. 26, 1969) (quotation available at http://www.bartleby.com/63/84/384 html) (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2007); see also Jutta Brunnée, The United States and International Environmental Law: 
Living with an Elephant, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 617, 618 (2004) (noting that when it comes to envi-
ronmental concerns, “the United States is the elephant next door”). 
33. See Alan Nymark, Canada-U.S. Environmental Cooperation, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 27 (2002) 
(Canadian Deputy Minister of Environment describing shared environmental challenges facing 
the two countries); Barry Sadler, Shared Resources, Common Future: Sustainable Management 
of Canada-United States Border Waters, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 375, 376 (1993) (describing 
shared water resource challenges). 
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shared rivers and lakes,34 including the Great Lakes, which is the 
world’s large surface freshwater system (twenty percent of the world’s 
supply).35 With such a large number of shared resources and high level 
of integration, the two countries can hardly avoid sporadic disputes.36 
The reasons for the countries’ willingness to resolve disputes coope-
ratively are open to debate. On the one hand, the historic cooperation 
may be nothing more than the result of close cultural ties and a common 
history. Canada “share[s] a common law heritage in private law and in 
liberal democratic and federal structures of government” with the Unit-
ed States and the countries have other historical, societal, and legal si-
milarities.37 Contact between the two nations is significant. For instance, 
over “2.4 billion phone calls took place between [the] two countries in 
2002.”38 Also, over 250,000 people living in Canada are Americans or 
were born in the United States, while in the United States there are over 
630,000 people with Canadian ancestry.39 And the majority of Cana-
dians and Americans share a common language. Not surprisingly then, 
                                                          
34. See Catherine A. Cooper, The Management of International Environmental Disputes in 
the Context of Canada-United States Relations: A Survey and Evaluation of Techniques and Me-
chanisms, 24 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 247, 249 (1986); see also Gallob, supra note 17, at 112. 
35. J. David Prince, State Control of Great Lakes Water Diversion, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 107, 108 (1990). 
36. Lynton K. Caldwell, Transboundary Conflicts: Resources and Environment, in THE 
CANADA-UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP: THE POLITICS OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION 15 (Jonathan Lemco ed., 1992) (“The topography and hydrology bisected by the 
political boundary dividing Canada and the United States makes binational environmental policy 
problems inevitable.”); see also Cooper, supra note 34, at 249 (explaining that the geographic 
setting between the U.S. and Canada provides “ample opportunity for the generation of interna-
tional environmental disputes”); John N. Hanson et al., The Application of the United States Ha-
zardous Waste Cleanup Laws in the Canada-U.S. Context, 18 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 137, 137–38 (1992) 
(“[I]ncreasing integration of the Canadian and United States economies, a process accelerated by 
the Canada/United States Free Trade Agreement, and the tightening of environmental standards 
on both sides of the border, is likely to result in increased environmental litigation between Cana-
dian and United States parties.”); David G. Lemarquand, Preconditions to Cooperation in Cana-
da-United States Boundary Waters, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 221, 221–23 (1986) (describing the 
risk of transboundary water pollution and disputes between the two nations). 
37. Gérard V. La Forest, The Use of American Precedents in Canadian Courts, 46 ME. L. 
REV. 211, 212–13 (1994). La Forest also notes that there are “commercial and other forces pecu-
liar to North American legal and societal development.” Id. at 213; see also Sarah K. Harding, 
Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 409, 411, 412 (2003) (“As fol-
lowers of the common law tradition, [Canada and the United States] adhere to similar interpreta-
tions of the rule of law, follow similar procedural and evidentiary rules, and believe strongly in 
the concept of stare decisis.”). 
38. Hon. Marlene Jennings, Session 12: The Future of the Evolving, Special Canada-U.S. Re-
lationship: New Dimensions and Possible Future Progress and Concerns, 31 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 385, 
385–86 (2005) (citing U.S. and Canadian census data). 
39. Id. 
2007] LITIGATING TRANSBOUNDARY HARM 11 
 
 
Canadians and Americans “tend to have closely similar attitudes, inter-
ests, and, arguably, a uniquely North American perspective and ap-
proach to problems.”40 
On the other hand, the existence of international agreements and bila-
teral institutions has contributed to the historic success in the countries’ 
cooperative approach to transboundary disputes.41 Bilateral treaties are 
one part of the equation. Almost a century ago, the two countries “estab-
lished the foundation for their bilateral relationship on environmental 
matters with the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909….”42 The treaty pro-
vides several means of addressing transboundary disputes,43 and it im-
poses obligations on the countries not to pollute boundary waters.44 The 
two countries subsequently have entered into literally hundreds of trea-
ties that address a wide range of trade and environmental issues.45 
Cooperation and bi-national management of shared resources has not 
been limited in form to treaties. One of the lasting contributions to the 
                                                          
40. Bilder, supra note 25, at 13; see also John F. Helliwell, Canada: Life Beyond the Looking 
Glass, 15 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 107, 108 (2001) (arguing that the “United States is of far more im-
portance to Canadian life and attitudes than the strength of the bilateral economic ties would sug-
gest”). Differences, of course, do exist. See, e.g., VOLKER THOMSEN, CANADA ENROUTE TO 
PROSPERITY 18 (2004) (noting that despite “Canada’s dependence on the U.S. mar-
ket[,]…Canadian values [are] so different from U.S. values” and Canadian “ambitions are differ-
ent from U.S. ambitions”). 
41. See Kal J. Holsti & Thomas Allen Levy, Bilateral Institutions and Transgovernmental 
Relations Between Canada and the United States, in CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: 
TRANSNATIONAL AND TRANSGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 281, 285–86 (Annette Baker Fox et 
al. eds., 1976). 
42. Hall, supra note 17, at 19; see also Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain 
Relating to the Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 11, 
1909, 36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty]. 
43. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 42, pmbl. ( noting that the Treaty’s purpose was to 
“prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary waters and to settle all questions which are now 
pending… involving the rights, obligations, or interests [of Canada and the United States]”); see 
also F.J.E. Jordan, Great Lakes Pollution: A Framework for Action, 5 OTTAWA L. REV. 65, 66 
(1971–1972) (describing the purpose of the Boundary Waters Treaty). 
44. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 42, art. IV; see also Jordan, supra note 43, at 67–68 
(describing Canada’s insistence that a provision prohibiting pollution be included in the Boundary 
Waters Treaty). 
45. Canada is party to over 680 bilateral treaties with the United States. Department of For-
eign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada, Canada Treaty Information, 
http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca (last visited August 24, 2006). See generally M. Grace Giorgio, 
Transboundary Pollution Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 3 S.C. 
ENVTL. L.J. 166, 174–78 (1994) (detailing the agreements and treaties between the United States 
and Canada relating to water, air, and hazardous waste). Another environmental area where the 
United States and Canada have a long history of cooperation is in the protection of migratory 
birds and animals. See, e.g., Convention on the Protection of Migratory Birds in the United States 
and Canada, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702. 
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Canadian-U.S. relationship made by the Boundary Waters Treaty was 
its creation of the International Joint Commission (IJC). Composed of 
six members (three from each country), the IJC was the first permanent 
U.S.-Canadian institution46 and was intended to be nonpolitical and im-
partial.47 The IJC “provides transboundary oversight, research, and fact-
finding for the two governments….”48 It has the ability both to issue 
binding arbitral decisions, and to conduct nonbinding investigative re-
ports.49 While the binding procedures have not been utilized,50 dozens 
of issues have been referred to the IJC for nonbinding recommenda-
tions51 and the IJC has handled well over a hundred cases.52 Until re-
cently, the IJC has received high grades for its ability to work quiet dip-
lomacy as a gentle persuader,53 and has “been praised as a low-key, 
                                                          
46. See Holsti & Levy, supra note 41, at 284. 
47. International Joint Commission, Who We Are, 
http://www.ijc.org/en/background/biogr_commiss htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2006); see also P.W. 
BERNIE & A.E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 326 (2002) (praising the 
IJC’s “independence [from] both governments” as an “important and unusual characteristic[]”); 
L.H. Legault, The Roles of Law and Diplomacy in Dispute Resolution: The IJC as a Possible 
Model, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 47, 49–50 (2000) (describing the Commissioner’s independence). For a 
recent discussion of the Commission and its powers, see Herb Gray, Session 8: Canada and U.S. 
Approaches to Health Care: How the Canadian and U.S. Political, Regulatory, and Legal Sys-
tems Impact Health Care, 31 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 287, 290–94 (2005). 
48. Caldwell, supra note 36, at 15. See generally J. Stephen Toope & Jutta Brunnée, Fresh-
water Regimes: The Mandate of the International Joint Commission, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 273, 276 (1998). 
49. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 42, art. IX (referral procedures); id., art. X (binding 
arbitration procedure); see also James G. Chandler & Michael J. Vechsler, The Great Lakes-St. 
Lawrence River Basin from an IJC Perspective, 18 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261, 265–67 (1992) (describ-
ing the procedure for referring matters to the IJC for investigation and for binding arbitration). 
50. See Chandler & Vechsler, supra note 49, at 263, 267 (explaining that the IJC has “never 
been asked to undertake [its binding arbitration role]”). 
51. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 26, at 165 (stating that the IJC “has played an important role 
in the settlement” of transboundary water disputes and that “[i]n over one hundred cases referred 
to it from 1912 to [1981] it has produced unanimous reports in all but four cases”); Jennifer 
Woodward, Note, International Pollution Control: The United States and Canada– The Interna-
tional Joint Commission, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 325, 329 (1988) (noting that from 
1909 to 1972, thirty-six references were sent to the IJC for nonbinding recommendations). 
52. See, e.g., INT’L JOINT COMM’N, THE IJC AND THE 21ST CENTURY 10 (1997), available at 
http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/pdf/ID1011.pdf (describing the more than one hundred cases 
referred to the IJC from 1912 through 1977); Richard Kyle Paisley et al., Transboundary Water 
Management: An Institutional Comparison Among Canada, the United States and Mexico, 9 
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 177, 181–87 (2004) (explaining how the IJC has reconciled or averted 
more than 130 disputes). 
53. See, e.g., Leonard W. Dworsky & Albert E. Utton, Assessing North America’s Manage-
ment of its Transboundary Waters, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 413, 416 (1993) (describing the IJC as 
a “model[] of success in many ways”); Gregory Wetston & Armin Rosencranz, Transboundary 
Air Pollution: The Search for an International Response, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 134 (1984) 
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behind the scenes actor that helps move governments to solutions the 
governments are prepared to accept.”54 One would find it “hard to quar-
rel with [the IJC’s] long record of success” as a “truly one of a kind sys-
tem for the settlement of disputes.”55 
Of course, the IJC is not the only established institution between the 
two countries. A more recent institution for resolving transboundary 
disputes developed from the environmental side agreement to 
NAFTA—the North American Agreement on Environmental Coopera-
tion (the Side Agreement).56 The Side Agreement’s purpose was to ad-
dress regional environmental concerns57 and to promote the effective 
enforcement of environmental laws, while preventing potential trade 
and environmental conflicts.58 To accomplish this, the Side Agreement 
established the North American Commission on Environmental Coop-
eration (CEC). Three entities compose the CEC: “the Council (made up 
of cabinet-level environment ministers from the three countries); the 
Joint Public Advisory Committee (made up of fifteen appointed mem-
bers, five from each of the three countries), and the Secretariat (a pro-
fessional staff).”59 In addition to government-to-government claims, 
                                                                                                                                      
(“[T]he IJC is highly respected and its recommendations are very influential in both the United 
States and Canada.”); see also INT’L JOINT COMM’N, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 2005 
ANNUAL REPORT (2005), available at http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/pdf/ID1591.pdf 
(summarizing IJC activities). 
54. Alan M. Schwartz, Great Lakes: Great Rhetoric, in TENSIONS AT THE BORDER: ENERGY 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 4, 70 (Jonathan Lemco 
ed., 1992); see also John E. Carroll, Patterns Old and New, in THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT 
COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON 43 (Robert Spencer et al. eds., 1981) (noting the history of the 
IJC’s success). For a discussion of the IJC’s influence in Canadian and U.S. relations, see Parrish, 
supra note 15. 
55. Legault, supra note 47, at 54; see also Timothy M. Gulden, Transfrontier Pollution and 
the International Joint Commission: A Superior Means of Dispute Resolution, 17 SW. U. L. REV. 
43, 57–63 (1987–1988) (explaining the value of the IJC as an institution for resolving cross-
border disputes). 
56. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Mex.-Can., art. 14, 
Sept. 8-14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480. 
57. For a summary of the environmental criticisms of NAFTA, see Halil Hasic, Article 1110 
of NAFTA: Investment Barriers to “Upward Harmonization” of Environmental Standards, 12 
SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 137 (2005). 
58. See, e.g., John H. Knox & David L. Markell, The Innovative North American Commission 
for Environmental Cooperation, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 1, 9–12 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003) 
(describing CEC’s development from NAFTA); Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the 
Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC as a Model for 
Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31 (1995) (describing the enforcement provisions of the CEC and 
the CEC’s development from NAFTA). 
59. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 17, at 306 (citing COMM'N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, 
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private actors are permitted to make submissions to the CEC if any of 
the state parties fail to effectively enforce their environmental laws.60 
The CEC is also empowered to investigate, develop factual records, and 
make nonbinding recommendations.61 Until recently, the CEC had taken 
an increasingly important role in resolving cross-border disagree-
ments.62 
B. The Retreat from Bilateralism 
The unparalleled cooperation between the two countries, however, 
may be cycling downward. Notably, the countries in recent years have 
been hesitant to use traditional transboundary dispute mechanisms. The 
countries have bypassed treaty processes,63 have stopped using the IJC 
on important matters,64 and have limited the CEC’s influence.65 Dis-
                                                                                                                                      
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: STRATEGIC PLAN OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION 2005–2010, at 5 (2005), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/publications/2005-2010-Strategic-plan_en.pdf). 
60. See John H. Knox, The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 429, 
429, 438–40 (2006) (describing submissions by private parties under the NAFTA side agreements 
and the intergovernmental procedures). 
61. See Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Adminis-
trative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1558–60 (2006) (describing the CEC and its operations). 
62. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS 
AND CHALLENGES 157–62 (2005) (describing work the CEC has accomplished); see also Edit 
Antal, Lessons from NAFTA: The Role of the North American Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation in Conciliating Trade and the Environment, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 167 (2006) 
(describing mechanisms that CEC has established for resolving disputes); Carolyn L. Deere & 
Daniel C. Esty, Trade and the Environment in the Americas: Overview of Key Issues, in 
GREENING THE AMERICAS: NAFTA'S LESSONS FOR HEMISPHERIC TRADE 1, 2, 15 (Carolyn L. 
Deere & Daniel C. Esty eds., 2002) (describing the CEC’s role in addressing environmental and 
trade issues); David L. Markell, The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
After Ten Years: Lessons About Institutional Structure and Public Participation in Governance, 
26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 341 (2004) (reviewing CEC’s performance after ten years). 
63. The Great Lakes provide one example. See, e.g., Dan Tarlock, Five Views of the Great 
Lakes and Why They Might Matter, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 21, 25–26 (2006) (“Canada and the 
United States have been trying to develop an effective binational regulatory regime for the lakes 
despite the fact that a functioning regulatory regime already exists—the 1909 Boundary Waters 
Treaty, administered by the IJC.”); Marcia Valiante, Harmonization of Great Lakes Water Man-
agement in the Shadow of NAFTA, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 525, 529 (2004) (“What was 
unique [about events leading up to the Compact and Agreement] is that they were first steps in a 
governance regime for the a Great Lakes region” at the sub-national level despite the existence of 
the Boundary Waters Treaty.). 
64. See Parrish, supra note 15; see also David Lemarquand, The International Joint Commis-
sion and Changing Canada-United States Boundary Relations, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 76–77 
(1993) (describing how recourse to the “historic International Joint Commission declined signifi-
cantly,” how Canada “lost confidence in bilateral institutional mechanisms,” and how in the early 
1990s, the governments had “little interest in seeing the IJC regain the profile it used to have in 
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putes that once seemed temporary and easily resolved have become “in-
creasingly protracted and difficult.”66 “From the closing of the U.S. 
border to Canadian beef and the softwood lumber impasse, to U.S. alle-
gations of lax Canadian immigration laws and security at airports and 
other points of entry, the disputes over cross border waterways, navigat-
ing the border relationship has become more complicated.”67 Some 
commentators have “decried the end of an era, arguing that the Canada-
U.S. relationship has been irrevocably changed.”68 
Three recent landmark, but contentious, disputes underscore the ex-
tent of the changed state of relations. First was Devils Lake.69 Several 
                                                                                                                                      
bilateral relations or take on any of the new environmental challenges facing the two countries”); 
Toope & Brunnée, supra note 48, at 282 (explaining how in the 1980s and 1990s, the countries 
“drastically reduced their reliance upon the IJC’s reference function”). 
65. See Knox, supra note 60, at 439–40 (describing the low number of submissions related to 
the United States). 
66. W.R. Derrick Sewell & Albert E. Utton, “Getting to Yes” in United States-Canadian Wa-
ter Disputes, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 201, 201–03 (1986); see also ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 3; 
cf. Deborah L. Vannijnatten, Canadian-American Environmental Relations: Interoperability and 
Politics, 34 AM. REV. CAN. STUD. 649 (2004) (describing the “serious tensions” between the 
United States and Canada, but arguing that environmental policy “has been minimally affected by 
such friction”). 
67. ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 3; see also Joseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter, The Realities of 
Regional Resource Management: Glacier National Park and its Neighbors Revisited, 33 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 298 (2006) (describing how “current relations between the United States and 
Canada are at a low ebb”); Press Release, Council on Hemispheric Aff.,  Rocky Road: U.S.-
Canadian Relations in Need of Further Repair, Now That Both Sides Make Concessions on De-
vils Lake Dispute (Aug. 8, 2005), http://www.coha.org/2005/08/08/rocky-road-us-canadian-
relations-in-need-of-further-repair-now-that-both-sides-make-concessions-on-devils-lake-
dispute/. 
68. ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 3; see also Sax & Keiter, supra note 67, at 297–98; cf. 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, BUILDING A NORTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY: REPORT OF AN 
INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE 1 (2005) (noting that Canada, Mexico, and the United States “face a 
historic challenge: Do they continue on the path of cooperation in promoting more secure and 
more prosperous North American societies, or do they pursue divergent and ultimately less secure 
and less prosperous courses?,” but concluding that governments are still committed to coopera-
tion). See generally TENSIONS AT THE BORDER, supra note 54 (describing tensions over climate 
change, acid rain, energy, and transboundary pollution). This is not the first time for such pessim-
ism. In the 1980s, several scholars argued that the “vision of a unique Canadian-U.S. talent for 
dispute-settlement” was “more rhetoric than reality—a tinsel romance under only a paper moon.” 
Bilder, supra note 25, at 6. 
69. See Hall, supra note 14, at 721 (describing the Devils Lake dispute); Joseph M. Flanders, 
Note, Transboundary Water Disputes on an International and State Platform: A Controversial 
Resolution to North Dakota’s Devils Lake Dilemma, 82 N.D. L. REV. 997, 1002–04 (2007) (de-
scribing dispute); see also People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. N.D. Dep't of Health, 697 
N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 2005) (Canadian environmentalist and Manitoba challenge to the North Dako-
ta Department of Health’s grant of a permit for diversion). For a related dispute where Canadians 
have turned to litigation in a U.S. court when diplomacy was ineffective, see Manitoba v. Norton, 
398 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2005) (dispute over the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s “NorthWest 
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years ago, the State of North Dakota embarked upon a plan to solve a 
drainage problem that Devils Lake causes. Devils Lake has no natural 
outlets; when it expands (as it has been), it causes substantial harm and 
dislocation.70 Working with the U.S. federal government, North Dakota 
developed a plan to build a drainage canal that would feed into the 
Sheyenne River.71 The Sheyenne River, however, flows into the Red 
River, which forms the border between North Dakota and Minnesota 
before crossing the U.S.-Canadian border into the province of Manitoba 
and eventually flowing into Lake Winnipeg.72 Concerned about the en-
vironmental impacts of this plan (in particular the introduction of inva-
sive species), Manitoba and various other groups objected.73 North Da-
kota ignored these objections, despite urging from the U.S. federal 
government.74 The dispute has been “nasty,” and has caused “political 
turmoil.”75 Although an agreement was reached eventually, the terms of 
                                                                                                                                      
Area Water Supply Project” in North Dakota). 
70. See Duncan Hollis, Disaggregating the Devils Lake: Can Non-State Actors, Hegemony, 
or Principal Agent Theory Explain the Boundary Waters Treaty? (Temple Univ. Legal Studies 
Res. Paper No. 2007-05, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=976829. 
71. See Abate, supra note 18, at 132; Hall, supra note 14, at 721. 
72. People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc., 697 N.W.2d at  323; see also Nicole Shalla, 
People To Save The Sheyenne River, Inc. v. North Dakota Department of Health: Setting A Per-
mit Precedent, While Allowing Pollution To Transcend International Borders, 10 GREAT PLAINS 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 73, 74–78 (2006) (summarizing the Sheyenne River case and describing the 
background of dispute). 
73. See generally DeNeen L. Brown, ‘Sacred’ Waters, Unholy Controversy; Dakota Tribe 
Fights Plan to Drain Lake, WASH. POST, June 25, 2004, at A14 (describing Canada-U.S. dispute 
over Devils Lake); Devils Lake Too 'Sacred' for Drainage: Elder from North Dakota Tribe Op-
posed to Controversial Project, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, June 30, 2004, at B10 (“Canadian offi-
cials have joined with environmental groups and native Americans to raise concerns about plans 
by the federal and state governments to build drainage outlets, intended to reduce the lake's flood-
ing.”). 
74. See John Knox, Environment: Garrison Dam, the Columbia River, the IJC, and NGOs, 30 
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 129, 133–34 (2004); see also Hollis, supra note 70, at 4; Sheryl A. Rosenberg, A 
Canadian Perspective on the Devils Lake Outlet: Towards an Environmental Assessment Model 
for Management of Transboundary Disputes, 76 N.D. L. REV. 817, 839–40 (2000). 
75. Devils Lake Dilemma, CBC NEWS, Aug. 5, 2005, http://www.cbc.ca/news/ back-
ground/water/devilslake.html; see also Wil Burns et al., International Environmental Law, 40 
INT’L LAW. 197, 208 (2006) (describing the “intense dispute”); It’s Getting Hard to Be Pal of 
U.S., KITCHENER REC. (Ont.), Aug. 17, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 12925589 (describing 
tensions); Paul Samyn, PM Plans to Battle Water Diversion Promising to Fight N.D. on Devils 
Lake Project, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, May 20, 2005, at A3 (quoting then-Prime Minister Paul 
Martin as saying that “Americans are wrong to think they can get away with polluting Canadian 
waters”); Is Water Treaty Enforceable in the U.S.? Questions Arise About International Deal, 
WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Sept. 7, 2006, at A1 (describing Devils Lake dispute, deploring U.S. un-
ilateral action, and quoting one politician as saying that “‘[o]ur ambassador should be screaming 
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the agreement required North Dakota to concede very little.76 Demon-
strating the distrust for bilateral institutions, both countries were unwil-
ling to submit the matter to the International Joint Commission77 and the 
CEC was unwilling to hear the dispute.78 
Second, on the heels of Devils Lake came the Trail Smelter contro-
versy. In Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.,79 the State of Wash-
ington and members of an Indian tribe sued Teck Cominco, the Cana-
dian mining giant, for hazardous water pollution emanating from Teck’s 
smelter. The smelter is located on the Columbia River in Trail, British 
Columbia, just ten kilometers upstream from the U.S. border.80 The 
plaintiffs sought to apply the U.S. Superfund law extraterritorially.81 If 
successful, Teck faces billions of dollars in liability. Again the countries 
did not attempt to head off private litigation through submission to the 
IJC, even though the IJC had successfully adjudicated a transboundary 
controversy involving the very same smelter seventy years earlier.82 
                                                                                                                                      
bloody murder’”). 
76. See John R. Crook, United States and Canada Agree on Measures To Address Devils 
Lake Flooding and Ecological Protection, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 909 (2005); see also Hollis, supra 
note 70, at 7. 
77. See Knox, supra note 74, at 138 (“[The] U.S. was temporarily willing to send Devil’s 
Lake to the IJC, but the Canadians objected, so it did not go. Now, the U.S. is not willing to go 
even though the Canadians are, so it is not going to go.”); see also Burns, supra note 75, at 208 
(noting that “attempts by the Canadian government to deal with the problem diplomatically, di-
rectly and through the International Joint Commission” were unsuccessful); Sax & Keiter, supra 
note 67, at 297–98 (describing the reluctance to use the IJC in the Devil’s Lake and other dis-
putes). 
78. See Hall, supra note 14, at 722 (describing how the CEC dismissed petitions on grounds 
that the Boundary Waters Treaty is not enforceable under U.S. law). 
79. 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,083 (E.D. Wash. 2004) (order denying motion to dismiss on juris-
dictional grounds), aff’d, 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2005). See generally Parrish, supra note 14, at 
363. Academics from both sides of the border have commented on the case. See, e.g., Brunée, 
supra note 32, at 628; Neil Craik, Transboundary Pollution, Unilateralism and the Limits of 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Second Trail Smelter Dispute, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION, supra note 11, at 
109; Gerald F. Hess, The Trail Smelter, the Columbia River, and the Extraterritorial Application 
of CERLCA, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2005); Robinson-Dorn, supra note 17. 
80. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, UPPER COLUMBIA RIVER EXPANDED SITE INSPECTION 
REPORT NORTHEAST WASHINGTON 2–10 (2003); see also EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 246 (1998) (explaining that the Trail Smel-
ter is “just north of the international boundary, about seven miles as the crow flies, or about ele-
ven miles along the course of the [Columbia] river”). 
81. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 9601 et seq. (2002). 
82. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938) (requiring that Canadian company op-
erating smelter cease causing damage in the State of Washington), further proceedings 3 R.I.A.A. 
1938 (1941) (holding Canada responsible for transboundary pollution). See generally John E. 
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Teck has asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision, which upheld the district court’s refusal to dismiss on jurisdic-
tional grounds.83 The Trail Smelter dispute has significantly increased 
border tensions,84 and may be the most important transboundary envi-
ronmental case in decades.85 
Finally, there was the Softwood Lumber impasse: a decades-long 
trade dispute over the Canadian export of softwood lumber.86 A “major 
irritant in U.S.-Canadian relations,”87 the dispute boiled over in 2002 
when the United States imposed countervailing and antidumping duties 
on Canadian lumber, claiming that Canada was impermissibly subsidiz-
ing timber harvesting.88 Over the last four years, Canada repeatedly has 
won rulings in NAFTA panels, but the United States has ignored 
them.89 In turn, the United States has collected a total of $5 billion in 
duties, and relies on favorable rulings in the World Trade Organization 
to resist Canadian entreaties to remove the duties and return the mon-
                                                                                                                                      
Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, 1 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 213 (1963) (describing the famous Trail 
Smelter Arbitration). 
83. Teck Cominco had asked for and was granted an extension to file for a writ of certiorari, 
which was granted by Justice Kennedy on January 12, 2007. The Supreme Court docket informa-
tion is online at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/06a686 htm.  
84. See EPA Battles Canadian Company over Columbia River, U.S. WATER NEWS ONLINE, 
Dec. 2003, available at http:///www.uswaternews.com/archives/arcquality/3epabat12 html (“Not 
since the Pig War of 1859 between the United States and Great Britain has there been such an 
international brouhaha in the Pacific Northwest.”). 
85. For a description of its importance, see Parrish, supra note 14. 
86. For an overview of the various WTO and NAFTA cases that comprise this dispute, see 
Chi Carmody, Softwood Lumber Dispute (2001–2006), 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 664 (2006) (describ-
ing the Softwood Lumber controversy in detail). 
87. John R. Crook, Preliminary Settlement of Softwood Lumber Dispute, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 
702, 702 (2006); see also John Bohn, Softwood Lumber Dispute with Canada Nears Climax, 21 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 24 (2006) (“The dispute with Canada regarding softwood lumber 
ranks as the largest and longest-lasting trade dispute involving the United States.”); Martin Crut-
singer, Hard Feelings up North over Softwood Trade Pact, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 28, 2006, at D1 
(describing the Softwood Lumber dispute as a “long, bitter fight”). 
88. The United States’ demands that Canadians change their logging practices have resonated 
with at least some Canadian environmentalists. Renegotiate NAFTA, New Green Party Leader 
Says, CBC NEWS, Aug. 26, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/ 08/26/greens html. But 
most environmental organizations in Canada, even if in favor of forestry reform, have been wary 
of appearing to be too supportive of U.S. demands for fear of being labeled "treasonous." Cana-
dian Environmentalists Deny Accusations of Treason, CBC NEWS, Mar. 20, 2001, 
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2001/03/20/softwood 010320 html# skip300x250. 
89. In fairness to the United States, seeking parallel redress in WTO and NAFTA panels is 
not usual. See Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2004, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 99, 198 (2005). But the total U.S. rejection of NAFTA panel decisions in a trade dispute with 
Canada was striking, as was the ineffectiveness of NAFTA in playing any kind of dispute resolu-
tion role. 
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ey.90 Recently, an agreement between Canadian Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper and President Bush has stipulated to the return of $4 billion in 
collected duties.91 Although the agreement seems to have temporarily 
quelled the dispute, the controversy has continued to simmer and ten-
sions build on a number of fronts.92 The Softwood Lumber dispute “has 
led some Canadians to question whether the United States will comply 
with NAFTA if decisions by the dispute-settlement mechanism run 
counter to private American interests.”93 Unfortunately, these three 
high-profile cross-border disputes do not stand alone. Numerous other 
tensions loom on the horizon.94 
                                                          
90. For a pre-agreement review of the legal wrangling, see Bhala & Gantz, supra note 89, at 
178–200. 
91. See, e.g., Crook, supra note 87, at 702. 
92. See, e.g., Lumber Deal Jeopardized by Opposition from BC, Timber Groups, 24 INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE 27 (2006) (“The British Columbia provincial government and producers…are oppos-
ing a final softwood lumber deal…, casting doubt on the agreement’s survival.”); Alan M. Field, 
Timber!, J. COM., Sept. 25, 2006 (arguing that even though the dispute is coming to an end with 
the agreement, many believe the agreement to be a “giant step in the wrong direction” and “exact-
ly the opposite of the approach [one] would need to forge a continental economy for global com-
petition”); Kelly Louiseize, Not Everyone Happy with Softwood Deal, 26 N. ONT. BUS. 28, 28–29 
(2006) (describing how the agreement has been forced on the Ontario Forest Industry and that 
“Canadian mills will be shut down in a bad market”); see also Softwood Lumber Dispute, CBC 
NEWS, Aug. 23, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/softwood_lumber/ (describing the 
resistance to the initial agreement from British Columbia, Quebec, and Alberta and a subsequent 
renegotiation of the agreement to address their concerns). 
93. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, BUILDING A NORTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY: 
REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE 16 (2005). 
94. See Crook, supra note 87, at 702–03; see also Hanson et al., supra note 36, at 137–38 
(predicting an increase in transboundary disputes); Parrish, supra note 14, at 380–82 (listing other 
cross-border disputes ongoing between Canada and the United States); cf. Wendy Stueck, Water 
Tension Rising Between Canada and the U.S.—Issues Surfacing as Population Growth Puts More 
Pressure on Shared Lakes and Rivers, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), May 17, 2005, at B7 (describ-
ing current transboundary water disputes). Two of the biggest disagreements are about borders 
themselves. See, e.g., Sheldon Alberts, Warming Stirs Arctic Feud, Congress Told–Retired U.S. 
Brass Warn Melting Makes Northwest Passage a Worry, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, May 11, 2007, 
at A18 (desribing a dispute over Canadian claims to arctic sovereignty in the Northwest Passage 
as a “future flashpoint between the two long-standing allies”); Shawn McCarthy, U.S. Says Can-
ada Blocking Review of Maine LNG Projects, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Mar. 9, 2007, at B3 
(“The proposals to build liquefied natural gas receiving terminals on Passamaquoddy Bay, off the 
Bay of Fundy, have become a major irritant between Washington and the [Canadian Govern-
ment].”); Barrie McKenna, Canada to Deny LNG Passage: Ottawa Tells U.S. That Access to 
Sites on Maritime Border Poses Many Risks, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 16, 2007, at B3 (de-
scribing sovereignty dispute where the United States claims passage is in international waters, 
while Canada insists it is in Canadian territory). Other suits involving cross-border environmental 
harm exist. See, e.g., Michael T. Delcomyn, Artic National Wildlife Refuge Oil: Canadian and 
Gwich’in Indian Legal Responses to 1002 Area Development, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 789 (2004) 
(describing possible lawsuits over ANWR oil drilling); Donald Goldberg & Martin Wagner, Hu-
man Rights Litigation to Protect the Peoples of the Artic, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 227 
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To some extent, the reason for this changed state of North American 
cooperation is symptomatic of the U.S. federal government’s approach 
to international law and environmental policy more broadly, rather than 
any particular hostility towards Canada. The American withdrawal from 
cooperative institutions such as the IJC and the CEC appears part of a 
larger trend.95 In recent years, the United States has rejected or retreated 
from all kinds of international institutions, agreements, and bilateral 
treaties.96 Academics often have encouraged the disengagement, assert-
ing that international institutions like the IJC and CEC threaten demo-
cratic sovereignty.97 And in the last two decades, Americans have had 
                                                                                                                                      
(2004) (discussing the human rights petition with the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights for damages to the Artic, impacting the Inuit, as a result of U.S. greenhouse gas emis-
sions). 
95. For a discussion of this trend, see Bryant G. Garth, Rebuilding International Law After the 
September 11th Attack: Contrasting Agendas of High Priests and Legal Realists, 4 LOY. U. CHIC. 
INT’L L.J. 101, 101–02 (2007) (explaining how the Bush Administration believed after 9/11 that 
“[i]nternational law needed to be put in the service of the War on Terror or ignored” and detailing 
a “series of anti-international law decisions”). See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: 
AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES FROM FDR’S ATLANTIC 
CHARTER TO GEORGE W. BUSH’S ILLEGAL WAR (2005) (criticizing the United States for its 
withdrawal from international norms). 
96. See, e.g., David D. Caron, Between Empire and Community: The United States and Multi-
lateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 395, 395 (2003) (“The 
basic underlying assertion in this muddy torrent is that the United States has changed its attitude 
and practice toward multilateralism dramatically….”); Anupam Chandler, Globalization and Dis-
trust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1197 (2005) (describing U.S. opposition to a “dazzling[ly] broad” 
range of international laws and institutions, including the ICC, the Kyoto Protocol, United Na-
tions agencies, the Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty); 
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of In-
ternational Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647, 670 (2006) (describing the United States’ “decidedly 
uneasy relationship with international legal norms and institutions” and listing examples of U.S. 
withdrawal); Esty, supra note 61, at 1493–94, 1562 n.3 (2006) (describing how both the political 
left and right distrust international institutions and law, and noting the U.S. withdrawal from the 
Protocol on the Vienna Convention to Consular Relations, refusal to ratify treaties on a global 
landmine ban, and obstruction of the World Health Organization’s public campaign aimed at 
smoking); Giulio M. Gallarotti, The Limits of International Organization: Systematic Failure in 
the Management of International Relations, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 375, 379 
(Paul F. Diehl ed., 1997) (explaining how international organizations "ha[ve] been attacked both 
from the right and the left…. ”). 
97. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005) (presenting a critical, negative view of international law and a disdain for international 
institutions); John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 
205 (2000); Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT'L 
L. 237 (2000); Paul B. Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade Or-
ganization, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 49, 73 (2000). See generally Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavin-
buk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404 (2006) (review-
ing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)) 
(describing the revisionist movement to undermine the use of international law because of its per-
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an increasingly uneasy relationship with international law and institu-
tions generally.98  Certainly, policy-makers have focused on the impor-
tance of local and regional actors in U.S.-Canada transboundary rela-
tions, and have downplayed federal cooperation and bilateralism.99 
Nowhere is the disengagement with international law more evident than 
with treaties involving environmental issues.100 In the international en-
vironmental context, some scholars have described how the U.S. has 
turned increasingly to unilateralism and away from traditional interna-
tional cooperation.101 For environmental issues, the reluctance to coope-
rate, however, is also symptomatic of the federal government’s envi-
ronmental agenda.102 Since 2000, the Bush Administration has presided 
                                                                                                                                      
ceived threat to democratic governance). 
98. Peter Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and its False Prophets, 
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2000, at 9, 9 (describing how “anti-internationalism runs deep in the 
American political tradition”). See generally INSTITUTE FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADE POLICY, 
THE TREATY DATABASE: A MONITOR OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS iv (2004) 
(describing how the United States has lost enthusiasm for international agreements, and that this 
retreat from international law began before the Bush Administration). 
99. Allen L. Springer, From Trail Smelter to Devils Lake: The Need for Effective Federal In-
volvement in Canadian-American Environmental Disputes, 37 AM. REV. OF CAN. STUD. 77 
(2007) (criticizing the singular focus on local and regional actors and the “view that national gov-
ernments should be kept at arm's length, at least until the problems faced become so intractable 
that only federal intervention can break the deadlock”). 
100. See, e.g., J. William Futrell, Multilateral Environmental Agreements, SL098 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 1, 9 (2006) (listing ten international environmental agreements that the United States ne-
gotiated but to which the United States is not a party, and describing the “ill will” the United 
States has created globally by imposing a perceived double standard). 
101. Brunnée, supra note 32, at 624 (describing the U.S. withdrawal from international envi-
ronmental treaties); see also Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A 
Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596 (1999) (discuss-
ing concerns over loss of democratic sovereignty through use of international treaty regimes). 
102. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Per-
verse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 777 (2006) 
(“The Bush Administration has pursued a series of initiatives, in both the pollution and federal 
lands contexts, that make it more difficult for the federal government to prevent environmental 
harm, including the adoption of weaker regulations, the reduction of funds for environmental pro-
tection purposes, and a failure to enforce environmental laws and regulations against alleged vi-
olators.”). These feelings are widespread among academics. See, e.g., ROBERT PERKS ET AL., 
REWRITING THE RULES: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S ASSAULT ON THE ENVIRONMENT (2002); 
John M. Carter et al., Cutting Science, Ecology, and Transparency Out of National Forest Man-
agement: How the Bush Administration Uses the Judicial System to Weaken Environmental Laws, 
33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,959 (2003); Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental 
Policy Under Bush II, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 363, 364 (2004) (arguing that the Bush 
Administration is making damaging changes to the environmental law in a deceptive way). The 
sentiments are also described in the popular press. See, e.g., Mark Grossi, Norton Stops by Yose-
mite; Interior Secretary Defends Restoration, FRESNO BEE, Apr. 23, 2004, at A1 (“Environmen-
talists, who say Bush is attempting to dismantle decades of environmental law, also attended the 
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over an almost complete stalemate in terms of environmental law and 
policy.103 
The blame, however, does not lie solely with the United States. Al-
though Canadians usually pride themselves as being a team player on 
the international stage,104 in the changed state of U.S.-Canada relations, 
Canada seems to have demonstrated a less cooperative spirit. Former 
Prime Minister Paul Martin, fighting for his political life in 2005, loudly 
refused to support President Bush's proposed missile defense system.105 
Continuing Canadian military support for the U.S.-led mission to re-
build Afghanistan has met with intense Canadian criticism.106 The new-
ly elected leader of Canada's Green Party has called for renegotiating 
NAFTA, saying that “it works for the U.S., but not for Canada.”107 Even 
the softwood lumber deal that Prime Minister Harper negotiated seemed 
uncertain because two key Canadian firms were reluctant to withdraw 
their own lawsuits against the United States for imposing the counter-
vailing and antidumping duties.108 
                                                                                                                                      
Earth Day event.”). 
103. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and 
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 749–50 (2006) (“[T]oday we find ourselves 
in an era where there is significant public concern over the failure of the federal executive and 
legislative branches to take strong action on today’s environmental challenges, whether they are 
automobile emissions, global warming, water pollution, or regulation of toxic substances.”); Ri-
chard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmen-
tal Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 619, 629–33 (2006) (describing how “[i]n recent years, the formal 
environmental lawmaking dimension of Congress has become effectively moribund”). 
104. For example, Canadian armed forces have taken part in virtually every major world con-
flict since its confederation in 1867, playing disproportionately large, important, and costly (from 
a Canadian perspective) roles in World Wars I and II. Canada's only Nobel Peace Prize winner, 
former Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, earned his international renown for helping to resolve 
the 1956 Suez crisis by introducing the idea of a United Nations peacekeeping force, a quintes-
sentially Canadian solution of cooperative mediation in military conflicts. DESMOND MORTON, A 
SHORT HISTORY OF CANADA 240–42 (2000). 
105. See Martin, Bush Discuss Canada's Pass on Missile Defence, CBC NEWS, Mar. 5, 2005, 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2005/03/05/martin-missile050305 html. 
106. See Alexander Panetta, Opposition Threatens To Topple Harper Government over Afg-
hanistan, CBC NEWS, Dec. 11, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/cp/national/061211/ n121191A html. 
107. Renegotiate NAFTA, New Green Party Leader Says, CBC NEWS, Aug. 26, 2006, 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/08/26/greens html.  
108. See Steve Mertl, Ottawa Sets Oct. 12 as New Date for Implementing Softwood Lumber 
Deal with U.S., CANADIAN PRESS, Oct. 9, 2006 (describing how “a substantial number of lumber 
exporters refused to withdraw legal actions against the United States over punitive softwood du-
ties, a key U.S. requirement for it to revoke the duties”); see also Josie Newman, Timber Accord 
Rankles Canadian Firms: Many Charge That Agreement To Pay Taxes on a Sliding Scale on Ex-
ports to U.S. Violates Free Trade, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 18, 2006 (explaining timber 
producers opposition to the agreement); U.S., Canadian Lumber Groups Oppose Dismissal of 
NAFTA Case, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 1, 2006 (describing attempts to keep NAFTA challenges 
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The most telling change in the Canadian approach, however, may be 
the seminal 2005 Canadian Supreme Court decision in British Columbia v. 
Imperial Tobacco.109 In that case, the Court upheld British Columbia’s re-
covery of damages from twelve tobacco manufacturers (nine of them non-
Canadian)110 for health care costs associated with tobacco use.111 What is 
extraordinary about the Imperial Tobacco case is that it not only applied 
British Columbia law to American defendants that had no presence in Can-
ada (except for tobacco sales), but it involved a newly-enacted provincial 
statute112 that reversed the burden of proof with respect to whether a pa-
tient's illness actually resulted from tobacco use.113 British Columbia's wil-
lingness to enact, and the Canadian Supreme Court’s willingness to uphold, 
such a significant departure from the usual norms of litigation114 may signal 
an erosion of Canada’s traditionally cooperative spirit (if not a blueprint for 
future litigation).115  
The reason for Canada’s retreat from bilateralism with the U.S. is 
open to speculation.  In part, Canada may have few options when faced 
with American intransigence.  But with more nationalist moods at home, 
Canada too has become concerned over the loss of its sovereignty.116  Al-
                                                                                                                                      
alive).  
109. [2005] 2. S.C.R. 473 (Can.). 
110. The appellants before the Canadian Supreme Court included: Imperial Tobacco Canada 
Ltd., Rothmans, Benson & Hedges, Inc., JTI-MacDonald Corp., Canadian Tobacco Manufac-
tures’ Council, Philip Morris Inc., Philip Morris International Inc., and British American Tobacco 
(Investments) Ltd. Some were Canadian corporations, others were incorporated under the laws of 
Virginia and Delaware, and the remainder were incorporated in the United Kingdom. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, 2005 S.C., ch. 46 (Can.). 
113. [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473 (Can.); see also Devrin Froese, Professor Raz, the Rule of Law, and 
the Tobacco Act, 19 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 161, 161 (2006) (describing the Tobacco Damages and 
Health Care Costs Recovery Act as altering the rules of civil procedure and evidence “to allow 
the government to overcome difficulties in proving causation”). 
114. See, e.g., David R. Wooley, Acid Rain: Canadian Litigation Options in U.S. Court and 
Agency Proceedings, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 139, 140 (1985) (describing how the “official position” 
of the Canadian federal government has been historically not to initiate or encourage litigation 
over transboundary air pollution). 
115. For a general discussion of the case, see Michael Hall, The Imperial Tobacco Approach 
to Territorial Limitations on Provincial Legislative Jurisdiction, 20 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 47 (2006) 
(describing traditional territorial limitations on jurisdiction under Canadian law). For criticism, 
see F.C. DeCoste, Smoked: Tradition and Rule of Law in British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco, 
Ltd., 24 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 327, 329 (2006) (criticizing the case for upholding a sta-
tute that “targeted certain, known defendants (tobacco companies one and all) and no one else; 
permitted the state to recover from them the cost of health care benefits without proving loss; im-
posed this liability retroactively without limit in time; abolished accrued limitations defenses; and 
established a special regime of procedural law, which impaired the ability of defendants to main-
tain any defense not otherwise legislated away”). 
116. Arthur T. Downey, Extraterritorial Sanctions in the Canada/U.S. Context – A U.S. 
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though supportive of international institutions, Canadians are increasingly 
less enthusiastic, if not distrustful, of bilateralism117 and U.S.-Canadian in-
stitutions, believing them unfairly to favor American interests.118 
 
II. CANADA’S TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION PROBLEM 
The real issue is whether the changed state of cooperation will spill 
over into other areas and upset the Canadian distrust of lawsuits as a 
way to remedy transboundary harm.119 Will Canadians follow the 
American trend and embrace extraterritoriality as a way to solve trans-
boundary problems? One of the most intractable challenges facing Can-
ada is transboundary air pollution—usually in the form of smog—
originating from the United States and causing the brunt of its harm in 
                                                                                                                                      
Perspective, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 215, 215 (1998) (noting how Canada has always been sensitive to 
being overtaken by American law and culture, and “sometimes suffers nightmares about the firm-
ness and durability of its own sovereignty”). 
117. See Derek H. Burney, Time for Courage on Foreign Policy, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), 
Feb. 13, 2005, at A13 (advocating for increased bilateralism and noting Canada’s recent policy of 
keeping “a safe distance” from the United States); John Ivison, An Olive Branch PM Should 
Grab: Bush Eager to Use Ottawa Visit to 'Mend Fences,' NAT. POST, Nov. 11, 2004, at A6 (de-
scribing chill in U.S.-Canada relations under Prime Minister Chretien’s leadership); Christina 
Spencer, Fumbling for Foothold: Why Bother with Foreign Policy? A Canadian at Oxford Con-
siders What Canada Could Be, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 12, 2004, at C8 (reviewing book and de-
scribing “Canadian exceptionalism” – “the tendency to assume the worst about Americans while 
always attributing the noblest motives to [Canadians]”). 
118. One good example of this is the Canadian approach to the IJC.  In the 1980s and 1990s, 
Canada came to view the IJC as a threat to domestic sovereignty that illegitimately favored Amer-
ican interests.  Kim Richard Nossal, The IJC in Retrospect, in THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT 
COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON 124, 129 (Robert Spencer et al. eds., 1981) (“To surrender – 
even willingly – a modicum of national sovereignty [to IJC-type institutions] would be disadvan-
tageous to both sides, but to Canadians in particular.”); see also Kal J. Holsti & Thomas Allen 
Levy, Bilateral Institutions and Transgovernmental Relations Between Canada and the United 
States, in CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: TRANSNATIONAL AND TRANSGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS 875, 879 n.2 (Annette Baker Fox et al. eds., 1974) (noting comments of a Canadian 
official “who suggested that more bodies of the IJC type would not be welcome [in the late 
1970s] because they are difficult to control by the central governments”); David Lemarquand, 
The International Joint Commission and Changing Canada-United States Boundary Relations, 33 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 76 (1993) (“Although Canada, as the smaller power, had traditionally 
found the IJC a useful balancing mechanism, the Canadian government confidence in the IJC was 
on increasingly shaky ground as Canada lost confidence in bilateral institutional mechanisms as 
the best means of dealing with the United States.”); Joseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter, The Reali-
ties of Regional Resource Management: Glacier National Park and its Neighbors Revisited, 33 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 295–98  (2006) (describing the unlikelihood that Canada would agree to an 
IJC referral on transboundary disputes). 
119. See Hall, supra note 14, at 738 n.338 (noting that “Canada does not have the same tradi-
tion of citizen enforcement [as the United States]”); see also Valiante, supra note 21, at 81. 
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Ontario.120 Unfortunately, despite various attempts over decades, Cana-
da has had little success in solving this problem using traditional diplo-
macy. Ontario pollution is fast becoming one of the more pressing irri-
tants in U.S-Canadian relations. As described below, Canadians may no 
longer be content to ignore the problem. 
A. A History of Transboundary Air Pollution 
Although a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, a 
little history places the current disagreement in context. For decades, 
transboundary air pollution, including SO2 emissions from coal-fired 
power plants, and NOx emissions from a variety of combustion sources, 
has been the primary cause of acid rain in Southern Ontario and Que-
bec.121 Bilateral efforts to curb transboundary emissions of SO2 and 
NOx began in earnest in 1966, when the IJC established a sub-body 
called the International Air Quality Advisory Board to advise both na-
tional governments on transboundary air issues.122 The problem became 
significant in the early 1980s: the United States “was emitting approx-
imately 25.7 million tons of sulphur dioxide and 23 million tons of ni-
trogen dioxide annually, while Canada’s annual emissions totaled 5.2 
million tons and 2 million tons, respectively.”123 In 1980, the United 
                                                          
120. See, e.g., HUNTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 552–59 (describing history of long-range 
transboundary air pollution disputes); Jon Ricci, Transboundary Air Pollution Between Canada 
and the United States: Paper Solutions to a Real Problem, 5 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 305, 305 (1996) 
(“Transboundary air pollution has long plagued relations between the United States and Cana-
da.”); see also ACID RAIN AND FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS: THE POLICY DISPUTE BETWEEN CANADA 
AND THE UNITED STATES (Junger Schmandt et al. eds., 1988). 
121. For a good short description of Canada-United States acid rain issues, see WEISS ET AL., 
supra note 80, at 577–86; see also Shawn M. Rosso, Acid Rain: The Use of Diplomacy, Policy 
and the Courts To Solve a Transboundary Pollution Problem, 8 J. NAT. RES. & ENVTL. L. 421, 
425–27 (1992) (describing diplomatic attempts to solve the transboundary acid rain problem in 
the 1970s through 1990s). See generally GREGORY S. WETSTONE & ARMIN ROSENCRANZ, ACID 
RAIN IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: NATIONAL RESPONSES TO AN INTERNATIONAL 
PROBLEM (1983). For information of particular relevance to private litigation to resolve acid rain 
problems, see James M. Fischer, The Availability of Private Remedies for Acid Rain Damage, 9 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 429 (1981). 
122. International Joint Commission, What Is the International Air Quality Advisory Board?, 
http://www.ijc.org/conseil_board/air_quality_board/en/iaqab_home_accueil htm. 
123. WEISS ET AL., supra note 80, at 579. For a description of the environmental and health 
damages caused by acid rain in the 1980s, see Elizabeth Knapp, Our Neighbor’s Keeper? The 
United States and Canada: Coping with Transboundary Air Pollution, 9 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
159, 166–72 (1985–1986); Erik K. Moller, Comment, The United States-Canadian Acid Rain 
Crisis: Proposal for an International Agreement, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1207, 1212 (1989) (citing 
studies showing that “50% of the acid rain falling in Canada originate[s] in the United States”). 
For more recent figures, see Tony Van Alphen, N.Y. Sick of Breathing Our Smoke; State Going to 
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States and Canada signed a Memorandum of Intent regarding Trans-
boundary Air Pollution, aspiring to jointly solve the problem.124 At 
times, the negotiations “were acrimonious, particularly during the Rea-
gan Presidency when the United States would only agree to study the 
problem more.”125 For “over a decade following the signing of the Me-
morandum of Intent in 1980, the countries failed to achieve significant 
progress in negotiating a bilateral agreement.”126 Not until 1991 did 
President George H.W. Bush and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney sign 
the Air Quality Agreement, which temporarily resolved the dispute.127 
Although the Air Quality Agreement was an advancement in many 
respects,128 it was another decade until the countries took significant 
further steps. In 2000, the countries signed Annex 3. Known as the 
ozone protocol or ozone annex, Annex 3 to the Air Quality Agreement 
contained specific obligations for both countries to reduce emissions of 
NOx and volatile organic compounds.129 Canada, for example, agreed to 
work towards aligning its motor-vehicle-emission regulations with U.S. 
standards, cap NOx emissions from Ontario power plants, and reduce 
                                                                                                                                      
NAFTA Panel over Ontario Power Plants’ ‘Clean Air Initiative’ Being Announced Today in Buf-
falo, TORONTO STAR, May 1, 2003, at C1, available at 2003 WLNR 5982008 (quoting Ontario 
Environment Minister Chris Stockwell as saying that the United States has “200 coal-fired plants 
in the northeast spewing coal-fired pollution into Ontario,” compared to three Canadian plants). 
124. See, e.g., WEISS ET AL., supra note 80, at 579. 
125. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 555; see also Peter Ballantyne, International Liability 
for Acid Rain, 41 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 63, 63 (1983) (describing how negotiations between 
the two countries reached an impasse in the early 1980s amidst claims of bad faith); Alastair R. 
Lucas, Acid Rain: The Canadian Position, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 165 (1983–1984) (describing dif-
ferences in how U.S. and Canadian scientists analyze the acid rain problem); Jeffrey L. Roelofs, 
United States-Canada Air Quality Agreement: A Framework for Addressing Transboundary Air 
Pollution Problems, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 421, 440–42 (1993) (describing stalemate and U.S. 
refusal to do more than study the problem–described as “research before action”); Gregory Wet-
stone & Armin Rosencranz, Transboundary Air Pollution: The Search for an International Re-
sponse, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 111–12 (1984) (describing the history of the negotiations 
and the reluctance of the United States to recognize an environmental problem). 
126. Roelofs, supra note 125, at 440. 
127. Agreement on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Mar. 13, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 676 (1991); see also 
Bush Says U.S.-Canada Air Quality Agreement Signifies “Extraordinarily Strong” Relations, 14 
INT’L ENV’T REP. (BNA) 174 (1991) (citing agreement as evidence that Canada and the United 
States have the “world’s most successful environmental relationship”). For a discussion of the 
U.S. approach to acid rain under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, see Roelofs, supra note 
125, at 442–44. 
128. See Roelofs, supra note 125, at 444–51. 
129. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 556 (describing how the parties added Annex 3 in 
2000); see also Jonathan Iversen, Transboundary Air Pollution: Moving Toward International 
Consensus, 2001 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 161, 165–69 (2001) (providing an overview 
of the agreement). 
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emissions from a variety of coating and refinishing operations, among 
other things.130 In a similar vein, the United States agreed to call for 
new state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act, requiring 
states to submit new plans to reduce NOx emissions in a regulatory ac-
tion known as the NOx SIP Call.131 The United States also obligated it-
self to implement VOC emissions reductions from a list of forty-one 
types of emitters and implement performance standards for new emis-
sions sources in thirty-five categories.132 The 2000 Ozone Annex reads 
like a highly-detailed and ambitious recipe for harmonizing standards 
on both sides of the U.S.-Canada border. Most recently, Canadian Envi-
ronment Minister John Baird and U.S. Environmental Protection Agen-
cy Administrator Stephen Johnson announced that they would begin ne-
gotiating an annex for particulate matter pollution.133 Given the 
"withering criticism" leveled at Johnson and the EPA over a recent de-
cision to let stand a ten-year-old standard for fine particulate matter 
however,134 the United States is extremely unlikely—having passed on 
                                                          
130. Protocol Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of Canada Amending the “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of Canada on Air Quality”, U.S.-Can., Dec. 7, 2000, 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/cleanair-airpur/caol/air/can_usa_e html [hereinafter Ozone Annex]; see, e.g., 
Dan McDermott, Editorial, Make Power Plants Coal-Free in 2007, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Sept. 
15, 2003, at A11 (describing the benefits of complying with the Ozone Annex). At the time, U.S. 
citizens complained loudly about the harm caused south of the border by Canadian transboundary 
pollution. See, e.g., Tom Cohen, Power Plants: Canadian Pollution Sickens Americans, GRAND 
FORKS HERALD, Feb. 6, 2001, at A3 (describing complaints by New York and Connecticut over 
transboundary pollution flowing south); N.Y., Conn. AGs Charge Ontario Power’s Plans for Coal 
Plants Are Inadequate, UTIL. ENV’T REP., Feb. 9, 2001, at 6 (describing a joint letter from New 
York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer and Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal to 
Canadian Environment Minister David Anderson to establish a review panel to examine plans to 
reduce coal plant emissions). 
131. Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone 
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 
Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, and 96). 
132. Ozone Annex, supra note 130.  
133. Press Release, Env’t Can., Canada and U.S. Move Forward to Reducing Air Pollution 
(Apr. 13, 2007), available at http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=714D9AAE-
1&news=1204208C-4F8B-45F8-A6C5-2BEA279D51D5. 
134. Clean Air Fine Particle Implementation Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 20,586-01 (Apr. 25, 2007) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51). The EPA tightened a 24-hour ambient air quality standard but 
let stand an annual standard, drawing criticism from a wide variety of groups and Northeastern 
states suffering downwind fine particulate matter pollution from Midwestern States. Daniel Cu-
sick, U.S., Canada Agreement Will Target Transborder Soot, GREENWIRE, Apr. 13, 2007 (on file 
with author). 
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protecting American populations—to engage with the problem of im-
proving Canadian air quality.135 
Despite early cheers of success, progress under the Air Quality 
Agreement and the companion Annex 3 has occurred only in fits and 
starts. Due in large part to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, which 
imposed an emissions trading program for power plant emissions of 
SO2, transboundary transport of SO2 declined substantially in the 
1990s.136 Momentum from Clinton Administration initiatives reduced 
emissions well into the Bush Administration, but progress on the legal 
and regulatory front has stalled since 2000.137 Although NOx emissions 
have continued a downward decline that began in 1997,138 sulfur dio-
xide emissions from electric generating plants have plateaued since 
2000.139 
One need not look far to uncover the reason for the recent stall in 
progress. Since 2000, the U.S. federal government has not made envi-
ronmental issues a top priority.140 Although President Bush has pro-
posed a further tightening of the original SO2 cap under his “Clear Skies 
Initiative,” he has been unable to push that initiative through Congress, 
due to opposition from Democrats.141 The Democrats, offering compet-
ing air pollution proposals which are more ambitious than the Clear 
                                                          
135. Given the divergent interests of the Ontario provincial government and the Canadian 
federal government, it would likely be of little interest to the former that the much more conserva-
tive federal government has commenced negotiations with U.S. environmental officials. 
136. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY AND EMISSIONS TRENDS 
REPORT, 45 fig.2-56 (2003); see also Jennifer Yelin-Kefer, Warming Up to an International 
Greenhouse Gas Market: Lessons from the U.S. Acid Rain Experience, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 221, 
224–41 (2001) (describing market mechanisms for controlling acid rain). 
137. See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text. 
138. INT’L JOINT COMM’N, UNITED STATES CANADA AIR QUALITY AGREEMENT, PROGRESS 
REPORT 2004, 4 fig.3, 20 fig.12 (2004), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/AIRMARKET/progsregs/usca/ docs/airus04.pdf. 
139. Id. at 2 fig.2; see supra note 136. 
140. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
141. President George W. Bush signed the Clear Skies Initiative in 2002. The initiative called 
for emission reductions through voluntary programs. See The Clear Skies Initiative, Executive 
Summary (Feb. 14, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2002/02/clearskies html; cf. Michael Traynor, Citizenship in a Time of Repression, 35 STETSON 
L. REV. 775, 778 (2006) (complaining about the government’s use of terminology and finding it 
“appall[ing]…that…a measure that would increase pollution” is described as the “Clear Skies 
Initiative”). For a general discussion, see Ronald P. Jackson, Jr., Extending the Success of the Ac-
id Rain Provisions of the Clean Air Act: An Analysis of the Clear Skies Initiative and Other Pro-
posed Legislative and Regulatory Schemes To Curb Multi-Pollutant Emissions from Fossil Fu-
eled Electric Generating Plants, 12 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 91 (2005) (analyzing and describing 
the Clear Skies Initiative). 
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Skies Initiative and also address greenhouse gas regulation, have stale-
mated Congress.142 The reduction of SO2 emissions has thus become a 
hostage to partisan wrangling and has been shelved in favor of more po-
litically salient issues such as terrorism. 
B. The Makings of a Transboundary Air Pollution Lawsuit 
From a Canadian perspective, the time appears ripe for a lawsuit over 
the continuing transboundary air pollution affecting Ontario. Every 
year, fine particulate matter143 and ozone air pollution annually cause 
almost 5,000 premature deaths, over 18,000 hospital admissions, over 
21,000 emergency room visits, and over four million minor illnesses.144 
These adverse health outcomes impose substantial costs in the form of 
direct and indirect health care costs, loss of productivity and tax reve-
nue, and the imputed value of loss of life.145 Last year, Ontario esti-
mated that yearly air pollution related health costs were more than $6.6 
billion. The amount is sobering: $600 for every man, woman and child 
in Ontario, or $1,000 for every man, woman, and child in the Toronto 
metro area, where most of the health effects are concentrated.146 Air pol-
lution causes a variety of other environmental damages too—including 
loss of visibility and damage to buildings, outdoor structures, crops, and 
forests—costing yearly an additional $3 billion annually.147 
                                                          
142. See supra note 103. 
143. Fine particulate matter (PM2 5), which consists of microscopic airborne solid or liquid 
particles, is the by-product of virtually any combustion process. The “2.5” subscript denotes the 
maximum diameter, in microns, of particulate matter that is considered “fine.” Particulate matter, 
denoted PM10, is smaller than ten microns in diameter, but larger than 2.5 microns in diameter. 
Fine particulate matter is microscopic and thus small enough to be inhaled and lodge in lung tis-
sue, where it can become carcinogenic or aggravate other lung diseases. A number of epidemio-
logical studies have recently identified fine particulate matter, and ground-level ozone to a lesser 
degree, as the most important pollution contributors to premature deaths and other illnesses. See 
generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Particulate Matter, 
http://www.epa.gov/particles/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2007). 
144. ONT. MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T, TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION IN ONTARIO 59 
(June 2005), available at http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/techdocs/5158e.pdf. 
145. Id. at 59; see also ONT. MED. ASS’N, THE ILLNESS COSTS OF AIR POLLUTION IN 
ONTARIO: A SUMMARY OF FINDING (2000), available at http://www.oma.org/phealth/ icap.htm. 
Of course, the health impacts of pollution are well understood and nothing new. See, e.g., David 
V. Bates & Ronnie Sitzo, Air Pollution and Hospital Admissions in Southern Ontario: The Acid 
Summer Haze Effect, 43 ENVTL. RES. 317, 328 (1987); Jonathan M. Samet et al., The Relation-
ship Between Air Pollution and Emergency Room Visits in an Industrial Community, 31 J. AIR 
POLLUTION CONTROL ASS'N 236 (1981). 
146. ONT. MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T, supra note 144, at 61 tbl.4.5. 
147. Id. 
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The international nature of the problem renders air pollution particu-
larly difficult to tackle. More than half of Ontario’s harmful air pollu-
tion originates in the United States148 In terms of cost, transboundary 
pollution accounts for $3.7 billion of the $6.6 billion in health costs, and 
half of the $3 billion of other environmental damages.149 Table 1 below 
shows the Canadian estimates for the total incidents of adverse health 
outcomes and the costs of those outcomes for particulate matter and 
ozone pollution in Ontario. 
Table 1150 
 Incidents from Ontario pol-
lution 
Incidents from transboundary 
pollution 
Premature deaths 2,130 2,751 
Hospital admissions 6,541 11,939 
Emergency room visits 7,950 13,925 
Minor illnesses 2,119,608 2,682,437 
 
Certainly, Ontario has its own housecleaning to do. Canadian envi-
ronmental organizations have often criticized Ontario’s smog plan as 
insufficient, and even a bit misleading.151 Ontario recently shelved a 
plan to retire all of its coal-fired power plants by 2007.152 First, the On-
tario government admitted that it did not have the means to replace the 
electricity generating capacity of those plants until 2009, and then, un-
der pressure, it conceded that even 2009 might be too ambitious.153 
                                                          
148. Id. at 54. 
149. Id. at 53–64 tbl.4.1; see also Stewart Elgie, Federal, State and Provincial Interplay Re-
garding Cross-Border Environmental Pollution, 27 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 205, 215 (2001) (describing 
the environmental interdependence between the United States and Canada and stating that “[f]ifty 
percent of Ontario’s air pollution comes from the U.S., [and] about eighty percent of the pollution 
of the Great Lakes comes from the U.S.….”). 
150. ONT. MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T, supra note 144, at 59 tbl.4.3. 
151. See, e.g., INT’L JOINT COMM’N, SYNTHESIS OF PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE 2004 
PROGRESS REPORT UNDER THE CANADA/UNITED STATES AIR QUALITY AGREEMENT (2005), 
available at http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/pdf/ID1585.pdf. 
152. In a 2003 campaign promise, Ontario Liberal Party leader Dalton McGuinty promised to 
close all coal-fired power plants by 2007. McGuinty, now Ontario’s Premier, admits that the 
province will not be able to get by without those power plants in 2007 and that it must delay that 
shutdown date to 2009, another target date that has been called into question. See Liberals Take 
Heat over Coal Power Plants on Day of Record May Consumption, CBC NEWS, May 30, 2006, 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/toronto/story/2006/05/30/tocoalplants 20060530 html; Liberals Will 
Delay Closing Two Coal Plants Past 2009, CBC NEWS, June 9, 2006, 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/toronto/story/2006/06/09/topower20060609 html. 
153. See, e.g., Liberals Take Heat, supra note 152. 
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There are signs, however, that Canada is now taking the air pollution 
problem seriously. Canadian Prime Minister Harper recently introduced 
a federal Clean Air Act, which he has sent to committee in the House of 
Commons.154 Ontario also has moved ahead, albeit slowly, with finding 
alternative sources of energy to replace the coal-fired capacity that it 
plans to mothball, including a newfound interest in nuclear energy.155 
The Canadian Broadcasting Company has reported that the Ontario 
government announced its plans to refurbish old nuclear power plants 
despite “raising the ire of environmentalists….”156 
Assuming that Ontario is willing and able to undertake its own 
house-cleaning, and perhaps because Ontario is willing to clean house, 
finding a way to make the United States take Ontario’s environmental 
concerns seriously becomes a high priority. Laurel Broten, Ontario’s 
Minister of the Environment, has missed few opportunities to remind 
Americans that air pollution emitted in the United States affects Cana-
dians.157 Through U.S. counsel, the Minister submitted comments to the 
Bush Administration’s proposed New Source Review reforms.158 Those 
                                                          
154. Bill C-30, An Act To Amend the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, the 
Energy Efficiency Act, and the Motor Vehicle Fuel Consumption Standards Act (Canada's Clean 
Air Act), was introduced on October 19, 2006, referred to Committee on December 4, 2006, and 
reported out of Committee with substantial amendments on March 30, 2007. See Bill C-30, An 
Act To Amend the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, the Energy Efficiency Act and 
the Motor Vehicle Fuel Consumption Standards Act (Canada's Clean Air Act), 2006 Parl., 1st 
Sess. (2006), available at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/legisinfo/index.asp?Language=E&Chamber=N&StartList=A&EndList=Z&
Session=14&Type=0&Scope=I&query=4842&List=stat. 
155. See, e.g., Steve Erwin, Six Ontario Sites To Be Considered for New Nuclear Reactors, 
CAN. PRESS, June 13, 2006 (describing efforts to build nuclear power plants in Ontario); Luann 
LaSalle, Nuclear Division of SNC-Lavalin Aiming To Help Build Ontario Power Plants, CAN. 
PRESS, Nov. 20, 2006 (describing the move to build nuclear power plants and how environmental 
concerns over nuclear power decrease when balanced against concerns regarding greenhouse gas 
emissions by coal, gas, and oil-fueled power plants); Ontario Power Authority Report Eyeing 
Three Sites for New Nuclear Plant, CAN. PRESS, Nov. 10, 2006 (describing the possibility of a 
new nuclear power plant on shores of Lake Erie). 
156. Ontario Will Build New, Refurbish Old, Nuclear Plants, CBC NEWS, June 14, 2006, 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/toronto/story/2006/06/14/to-nuclear20060614 html. 
157. The Minister has addressed the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., Hon. Laurel 
Broten, Minister of the Env’t, Media Briefing on Transboundary Air (May 10, 2006), available at 
http://www.ene. gov.on.ca/envision/news/speeches/051006 htm; filed an amicus brief in the case 
of United States v. Cinergy Corp., Brief of Amicus Curiae Province of Ontario in Support of 
Plaintiff-Appellee and Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees and Supporting Affirmance, United States 
v. Cinergy Corp., 458 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-1224), available at 
http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/ envision/air/transboundary/CinergyAppeal.pdf; and convened a spe-
cial executive committee on transboundary air pollution. 
158. See Press Release, Ont. Ministry of the Env’t, Ontario Challenges U.S. To Protect Air 
Quality: Reducing Transboundary Air Pollution Will Benefit All Ontarians (Feb. 17, 2006), 
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reforms, if adopted, would have weakened the Clean Air Act regulations 
mandating the upgrade of pollution control equipment whenever a new 
pollution source is constructed or substantially modified.159 The Minis-
ter’s comments, however, fell on deaf ears. At the very least, as far as 
environmental policy is concerned, the Minister's input was less influen-
tial than that of many other stakeholders in the Bush Administration. 
Ontario officials may have to confront the uncomfortable and un-
Canadian reality that filing a transnational civil lawsuit may be the only 
way to secure American engagement on the problem of transboundary 
air pollution. 
III. EXPLORING DOMESTIC SOLUTIONS: THE POSSIBILITIES OF 
LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION 
For the first time, domestic litigation may be a reasonable alternative 
for Canadians when diplomatic and bilateral dispute resolution proce-
dures have failed.160 Two landmark cases may allow Ontario to recover 
damages for transboundary air pollution: Pakootas v. Teck Cominco, a 
U.S. case, and British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco, a Canadian case. 
Together with significant advances in air quality modeling and in epi-
demiological research that link certain types of air pollution with specif-
ic health effects, Ontario may have a unique opportunity to forge a leg-
islative and litigation strategy for recovery against responsible parties in 
the United States. It may now be quite possible for Ontario to use do-
mestic law to remedy harms from transboundary pollution. 
                                                                                                                                      
available at http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/news/2006/021701 htm (reproducing comments 
filed with the EPA by Canadian Environment Minister Laurel Broten regarding Ontario’s con-
cerns with EPA plans to allow higher emissions from coal-burning power plants); see also Press 
Release, Ont. Ministry of the Env’t, Backgrounder: Support for Ontario Filing Comments with 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (Feb. 17, 2006) available at 
http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/news/2006/021701mb2 htm (listing environmentalists and 
politicians who support Ontario’s position to encourage the United States to reduce smog emis-
sions). 
159. See LAUREN BROTEN & MICHAEL BRYANT, PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT 
DETERIORATION, NONATTAINMENT NEW SOURCE REVIEW, AND NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE 
STANDARDS: EMISSIONS TEST FOR ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS (Feb. 17, 2006) (comments 
filed with U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Docket No. OAR-2005-0163), available at 
http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/air/transboundary/fullnsrcomments.pdf. 
160. For literature exploring lawsuits by Canadians against U.S. polluters in U.S. courts (not 
Canadian courts as discussed here), see Fischer, supra note 121; see also John Benham, Acid 
Rain: The Limitations of Private Remedies, 8 S. ILL. U. L.J. 515 (1983); Wooley, supra note 114, 
at 139. 
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A. The Jurisdictional Barriers 
For a long time, jurisdictional obstacles prevented Canadians from 
suing Americans for environmental damage caused by pollution origi-
nating in the United States.161 The first barrier to relief was subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, in the form of the local action rule. That long-standing 
common law rule provided, in broad terms, that “an action in tort for 
damage to real property must be brought where the property is lo-
cated.”162 Although courts applied the local action rule more liberally in 
the United States,163 the English common law from which the Canadian 
and U.S. rule derived164 excluded “all types of trespass to for-
eign…land….”165 As Chief Justice Baxter of the New Brunswick Su-
preme Court once explained: “[A]n action founded on trespass to realty 
in a foreign country whether the title does or does not come into ques-
tion can[not] be tried here.”166 The rule thus prevented Canadian citizens 
                                                          
161. See Michael I. Jeffery, Transboundary Pollution and Cross-Border Remedies, 18 CAN.-
U.S. L.J. 173, 173–74 (1992) (“Until recently, most plaintiffs in both the U.S. and Canada who 
suffered damage from a source of pollution originating outside the jurisdiction in which the dam-
age occurred, faced formidable obstacles in obtaining redress.”); see also Stephen McCaffrey, 
Private Remedies for Transfrontier Pollution Damage in Canada and the United States: A Com-
parative Survey, 19 U. W. ONT. L. REV. 35 (1981) (describing access problems for private suits). 
Indeed, the local action rule prevented private lawsuits against the Trail Smelter, leading to the 
famous Trail Smelter Arbitration. WEISS ET AL., supra note 80, at 262. 
162. Gallob, supra note 17, at 96; see also British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de 
Moçambique [1893] A.C. 602 (H.L.), rev’g [1892] 2 Q.B. 358 (C.A.). The Moçambique case was 
the seminal case that established the local action rule. 
163. See, e.g., Gerald F. FitzGerald, Note, The Proposed Canada-United States Transboun-
dary Air Pollution Agreement: The Legal Background, 20 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 219, 238 (1982) 
(describing the U.S. approach); H. Scott Fairley, Private Remedies for Transboundary Injury in 
Canada and the United States: Constraints Upon Having to Sue Where You Can Collect, 10 
OTTAWA L. REV. 253, 264–67 (1978) (describing the broader traditional approach of U.S. courts 
to the local action rule); Jeffery, supra note 161, at 174–76 (explaining how U.S. courts inter-
preted the local action rule more broadly than their Canadian counterparts); Stephen C. McCaff-
rey, Transboundary Pollution Injuries: Jurisdictional Considerations in Private Litigation Be-
tween Canada and the United States, 3 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 191, 221–24 (1973) (describing the 
“American courts’ disenchantment with the local action rule”). 
164. English courts had “no jurisdiction to entertain actions where the facts occurred abroad,” 
because of the “ancient common law practice whereby juries were chosen from persons ac-
quainted with the facts of a case, who therefore decided questions of fact from their own know-
ledge and not from evidence of witnesses.” Fairley, supra note 163, at 258 (1978) (quoting J. 
MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 293 (1971)). 
165. Gallob, supra note 17, at 96–97; see also William K. King, Transboundary Pollution: 
Canadian Jurisdiction, 1 CAN.-AM. L.J. 1, 9–14 (1982) (describing the Canadian approach to the 
local action rule in detail); McCaffrey, supra note 163, at 218–19 (describing the local action rule 
and why it presented a barrier to suit); Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330. 
166. Albert v. Fraser Companies Ltd., [1937] 1 D.L.R. 39, 46; see also Boslund v. Abbots-
ford Lumber, Mining & Dev. Co., [1925] 1 D.L.R. 978; Brereton v. Canadian Pacific Ry., [1898] 
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from filing suits in the United States against Americans for harm felt in 
Canada. Cases where Canadian residents have successfully sued U.S. 
corporations for pollution originating from the United States, therefore, 
have been rare.167 In fact, until the mid-1970s, no recorded decision ex-
isted involving Canadians suing Americans in a U.S. court for trans-
boundary pollution.168 Unfamiliarity with the legal system, the costs of 
bringing suit abroad, and the perception of bias (real or imagined)169 al-
so practically discouraged Canadians from suing in U.S. courts.170 
Not only were Canadians unlikely to succeed if they filed an action in 
the United States, they were also unlikely to sue successfully in a Cana-
dian court. In Canada, a court could overcome the local action rule,171 
but personal jurisdiction often would be lacking. Indeed, traditional 
concepts of personal jurisdiction—derived from international law con-
cepts of territorial sovereignty—prevented lawsuits where the defendant 
was not present.172 “Extraterritorial service of process was unknown at 
                                                                                                                                      
29 O.R. 57. 
167. For a notable exception, see Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat’l Steel Corp., 495 
F.2d 213 (1974) (thirty-seven Canadian residents sued three Michigan corporations for nuisance 
arising from the discharge of air pollutants, but ultimately settled out of court); see also Ricci, 
supra note 120, at 308–09 (describing the Michie case and settlement). See generally McCaffrey, 
supra note 161, at 36 (noting that “[i]n view of the seriousness of the [transboundary pollution] 
problem, it is somewhat surprising that there are not more reported lawsuits”). 
168. See McCaffrey, supra note 163, at 220. 
169. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1121–22, 1143 (1996) (exploring reasons why foreigners fear U.S. courts, 
and concluding that foreigners do not fare badly in U.S. litigation and that bias does not exist). 
But see Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern Justi-
fication for Federal Jurisdictions over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 35 
(1996) (describing the current bias that exists against foreign citizens). See generally Parrish, su-
pra note 14, at 405–06 nn.221–22 (describing the debate over whether bias exists against foreign 
citizens). 
170. See Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonre-
sident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 42–50 (2006) (describing the unique bur-
dens for foreigners litigating in U.S. courts); see also Parrish, supra note 14, at 408–09 (describ-
ing the perception of bias by Canadians that U.S. courts will favor U.S. interests in transboundary 
pollution disputes). 
171. Phillips v. Eyre, [1870] 6 Q.B. 1 (finding that suit may be brought in England for a 
wrongful act committed abroad if: (1) the wrong is of a character that it would have been actiona-
ble if committed in England; and (2) the act could not be justified by the law of the place where it 
occurred). See generally McCaffrey, supra note 163, at 240 (explaining why subject matter juris-
diction would not be an obstacle to suit in Canada for transboundary harm originating in the Unit-
ed States). 
172. See Parrish, supra note 170, at 8–10; see also McCaffrey, supra note 163, at 217, 239–
42 (“In some transnational pollution actions it will be impossible to bring defendant [sic] before a 
court at the place of the injury since the conditions necessary for assertion of personal jurisdiction 
will not be present.”); Roger H. Transgrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 
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common law,”173 and jurisdiction ended at the border.174 Although Ca-
nadian courts have now recognized the effects test175—permitting juris-
diction when effects are felt within the province—courts have been he-
sitant to exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants “with 
respect to the pursuit of transboundary mischief matters.”176 Even in the 
late 1970s, “judicial minds remain[ed] very sensitive [in Canada] to any 
modality which [might] be considered as constituting inappropriate in-
terference with another jurisdiction.”177 Traditionally then, the local ac-
tion rule, combined with the personal jurisdiction doctrine, prevented 
private lawsuits for transboundary harms.178 The famous Trail Smelter 
Arbitration has often been cited as an example where these two rules 
combined to prevent domestic litigation.179 In fact, the 1909 Boundary 
Waters Treaty was drafted precisely because at the time there existed 
“no remedies or redress” for transboundary harms.180 
                                                                                                                                      
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 871–72, 872 nn.116–20 (1989) (describing how the original rules of 
jurisdiction were based on rules of territorial sovereignty, and listing early cases that approached 
jurisdiction based on the Law of Nations). 
173. McCaffrey, supra note 163, at 241; see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
174. See generally Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 775, 796–808 (1955) (describing how the American colonies inherited jurisdictional prin-
ciples from international law that recognized territorial borders as the key limitation on a sove-
reign’s authority and jurisdiction); James Weinstein, The Dutch Influence on the Conception of 
Judicial Jurisdiction in 19th Century America, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 73, 74–85 (1990) (describing 
early American jurisdictional theories based on international territoriality principles developed by 
Dutch theorists). 
175. Moran v. Pyle Nat’l (Can.) Ltd., [1973] 43 D.L.R. (3d) 239, 250–51 (Can.) (finding per-
sonal jurisdiction when foreseeable harm could be caused in another province); Jenner v. Sun Oil 
Co., [1952] 2 D.L.R. 526, 526 (Ont. High Ct.) (finding jurisdiction over the American defendant 
in a defamation case, even though the defamatory words were not written or ushered in the juris-
diction when “they were so transmitted as to be published within the jurisdiction” in such a man-
ner as to be likely to “cause the plaintiff to suffer substantially in his reputation” in Ontario). 
176. Fairley, supra note 163, at 268. 
177. Id. at 268–69 (citing Interprovincial Coops. Ltd. v. Manitoba [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477 
(Can.)). 
178. See id. at 271 (noting that “Canadian legal precedents tend to be unnecessarily restrictive 
in respect” to transboundary pollution claims). 
179. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 511; WEISS ET AL., supra note 80, at 262 (describ-
ing the traditional jurisdictional hurdles to private litigation in the context of the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration). For the most comprehensive analysis of the case and its impact on modern interna-
tional environmental law, see TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM 
THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION, supra note 11. 
180. Robert Day Scott, The Canadian-American Boundary Waters Treaty: Why Article II?, 
36 CAN. B. REV. 511, 518 n.15 (1958) (quoting the Draft Press Release, prepared for Secretary 
Knox, in Chandler P. Anderson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (“[T]he treaty 
proceeds to establish a new rule for the benefit and protection of those interests, on either side of 
the boundary…there being, under existing conditions no remedies or redress in such cases.”); see 
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Jurisdictional barriers were not the only barriers to relief. Firstly, in 
Canada the statutory authority defense also often prevented litigation. 
“[I]f properly invoked, [the statutory authority defense] may provide a 
complete defense.”181 The defense applied in “most Canadian jurisdic-
tions, [because] many activities which cause pollution in one form or 
another are permitted by statute.”182 The seminal case, Manchester v. 
Farnworth, explains it well: “[w]hen Parliament has authorized a certain 
thing to be made or done in a certain place, there can be no action for 
nuisance caused by the making or doing…so authorized.”183 Even if 
federal or provincial environmental legislation existed, it was limited 
and “not as prevalent in Canada as it [was] in the United States.”184 Se-
condly, standing doctrines, as interpreted in Canada, also at one time 
created practical problems to redress.185 Even modern environmental 
legislation—such as Ontario’s Environmental Protection Act—was as-
sumed to apply only to conduct occurring within the province.186 Lastly, 
even if a judgment could be secured, enforcing the judgment against a 
defendant without assets in the jurisdiction could well be futile.187 More 
practically, the relatively small size of damage awards, the lack of con-
tingency fees, the unavailability of jury trials, and the reality that the 
losing parties usually pay attorneys fees have made Canadian litigation 
less attractive.188 
                                                                                                                                      
also McCaffrey, supra note 163, at 196 (discussing reasons for 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty and 
quoting Chandler P. Anderson). 
181. Jeffery, supra note 161, at 175. 
182. Id. (citing as examples, Smiley v. Ottawa, 2 D.L.R. 390 (1941) (Ont.); B.C. Pea Growers 
Ltd. v. Portage La Prairie, 43 D.L.R.2d 713 (1963) (Man.); N. Vancouver v. McKenzie Barge & 
Marine Ways Ltd., S.C. 377 (1965) (Can.)). 
183. Manchester v. Farnworth, [1930] A.C. 171, 183 (H.L. U.K.). 
184. Jeffery, supra note 161, at 182–83. 
185. Id. at 179. 
186. See McCaffrey, supra note 163, at 195 (describing the traditional “reluctan[ce] to grant 
injunctive relief because of the possibility that such would be viewed as an attempt to impose 
regulations on a foreign activity and as an improper interference with the economic affairs of the 
foreign state”). See generally Allan E. Gotlieb, Extraterritoriality: A Canadian Perspective, 5 
N.W. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 449, 457–59 (1983) (describing the Canadian approach to extraterrito-
riality, Canadian concern over U.S. extraterritorial application of laws, and the enactment of de-
fensive legislation); David Leyton-Brown, Extraterritoriality in Canadian-American Relations, 
36 INT’L J. 185, 205–06 (1980) (describing instances of extraterritorial U.S. laws impacting Can-
ada). 
187. See McCaffrey, supra note 163, at 217 (“Further, if defendant has no assets within the 
jurisdiction in which the injury occurred, he might simply disregard any proceedings there, forc-
ing plaintiff to obtain a default judgment of uncertain enforceability in defendant’s country.”). 
188. See McCaffrey, supra note 161, at 62–63; cf. John S. Willems, Shutting the U.S. Court-
house Door? Forum Non Conveniens in International Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug./Oct. 
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Times have changed. The legal impediments to Canadians suing 
Americans for U.S.-originated pollution “are being removed gradually 
by many jurisdictions in what may be characterized as a more focused 
attempt to prevent or curtail polluting activities and to ensure that those 
responsible bear the costs….”189 By the 1970s, personal jurisdiction law 
had developed in Canada to permit suit “in transboundary pollution cas-
es founded on nuisance or trespass theories….”190 In a seminal article in 
1973, Stephen McCaffrey concluded that although transboundary pollu-
tion cases might be difficult to prosecute, at least “the courts’ doors are 
open.”191 And in 1986, several American states and Canadian provinc-
es—including Ontario192—signed the Uniform Transboundary Reci-
procal Access Act. That Act, originating from the Canadian and Ameri-
can Bar Associations, “provides a remedy to actual or potential victims 
of transboundary pollution in the courts of the polluter’s residence if a 
victim residing within the country of origin would have had a remedy 
for that same pollution harm.”193 Although the two nations have not ac-
cepted the Draft Treaty,194 and it has not been widely adopted by the 
states and provinces,195 Americans and Canadians are nevertheless now 
“accustomed to asserting their rights and seeking redress for wrongs in 
each other’s courts.”196 
The Pakootas v. Teck Cominco197 case, involving an application of 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA),198 is a major reason that the legal landscape is 
changing.  Pakootas symbolizes many of the forces that have appeared 
to make litigation more palatable, and bilateralism less palatable.  First, 
                                                                                                                                      
2003, at 54, 56 (“Litigants are attracted to the high quality of U.S. courts, the willingness of U.S. 
courts to exercise jurisdiction over international disputes, and, rightly or wrongly, the belief that 
U.S. courts are ready to award large sums of damages.”). 
189. Jeffery, supra note 161, at 194. 
190. McCaffrey, supra note 163, at 249. 
191. Id. at 259; cf. Fischer, supra note 121. 
192. Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act, R.S.O. ch. T.18 (1990) (Can.). 
193. Gallob, supra note 17, at 92. 
194. Id. 
195. See John H. Knox, The CEC and Transboundary Pollution, in GREENING NAFTA: THE 
NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 80, 87–88 (David L. 
Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003). 
196. Wang, supra note 26, at 182 (describing the reliance on domestic law in U.S. and Cana-
dian disputes). 
197. 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,083 (E.D. Wash. 2004) (order denying motion to dismiss on juris-
dictional grounds), aff’d, 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2005).  
198. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compenstion, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
9601-9675 (2007). 
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the plaintiffs in Pakootas sought to leapfrog federal efforts to settle the 
dispute.  Relatively soon after the filing of the complaint, Canadian de-
fendant Teck Cominco reached a settlement agreement with the EPA 
staying the cleanup order.  But the Pakootas suit, unaffected by the set-
tlement agreement, nevertheless sought to enforce the cleanup order.199 
Second, from the other side of the border, the case also offers a poten-
tially important lesson in drafting self-serving statutes. In upholding the 
District Court’s refusal to grant Teck’s motion to dismiss, the Ninth 
Circuit reached the surprising conclusion that “the suit involve[d] a do-
mestic application of CERCLA,”200 even when regulating conduct oc-
curring solely outside U.S. borders. The Ninth Circuit broadly inter-
preted the term “facility” in CERCLA as including the site where the 
hazardous waste that Teck discharged came to rest (i.e., on the banks of 
Lake Roosevelt in the United States). Hence, according to the Ninth 
Circuit, the suit did not involve an extraterritorial application of law.201 
Whether or not this surprising ruling withstands Supreme Court re-
view202 is beside the point; as a matter of statutory interpretation, Ontar-
io could enact a statute that explicitly predicated liability on an event 
that takes place on Canadian soil—such as the receipt of air pollution on 
Canadian soil and by Canadian citizens—then liability, even if imposed 
upon U.S. polluters, would not be considered an extraterritorial exercise 
of jurisdiction. Or even if extraterritorial, the application would be per-
missible because significant effects are felt in Canada.203 
Ultimately, whether the jurisdictional barriers are entirely gone, how-
ever, may not be the right question to ask; perceptions may be more im-
portant than reality. Potential American defendants believe the barriers 
are lower, and are deeply concerned. In the earlier stages of the ongoing 
                                                          
199. See Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1071 n.10. 
200. Id. at 1069. 
201. Id. at 1074. The point is not that the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning was sound; it was not. The 
court’s reasoning and analysis is flawed in several respects. Rather the point is that what is good 
for the goose is good for the gander. If U.S. law permits such suits, then Canadian legislatures and 
courts may well be inclined to find that Canadian law permits the same kinds of suits.  
202. The U.S. Supreme Court is considering Teck Cominco's appeal and has invited the Soli-
citor General to file a brief representing the views of the United States.  127 S. Ct. 2930 (2007). 
203. For a discussion of the “effects test” as an exception to a general presumption against 
extraterritoriality, see Parrish, supra note 14, at 387–99. The effects doctrine is a controversial 
exception to the usual limits of territorial jurisdiction. Joseph J. Norton, The European Court of 
Justice Judgment in United Brands: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Abuse of Dominant Posi-
tion, 8 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 379, 385 (1979). For an in-depth discussion of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction under international law and its prevalence, see U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the 
International Law Commission, 58th Session, Annex E – Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 516, U.N. 
Doc. A/61/10 (2006), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2006/english/annexes.pdf. 
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Trail Smelter case, the National Mining Association and the Edison 
Electric Institute lobbied EPA Administrator Michael Leavitt, Secretary 
of State Colin Powell, and Attorney General John Ashcroft to stop the 
EPA from enforcing administrative orders against Teck.204 Member 
firms of the Edison Electric Institute—electricity generation companies 
that have coal-fired power plants that emit the pollutants that flow north 
and foul Ontario’s air—saw themselves as standing in Teck’s shoes.205 
The National Mining Association and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
also filed amicus briefs in the Ninth Circuit.206 Both groups were con-
cerned with the possibility of Canadians extraterritorially applying their 
own law, and argued against the U.S. court setting a precedent by per-
mitting the case to go forward. 
B. Causation—Identifying the Defendants 
Historically, if a plaintiff was able to navigate the various jurisdic-
tional barriers to suit, proving that the defendant caused the transboun-
dary harm was another challenge. The common law was not receptive to 
recovery when several possible defendants existed, let alone thou-
sands.207 Where a discrete and identifiable source of pollution from a 
single defendant imposed measurable harm, an action in nuisance would 
lie to abate the environmental harm,208 or, in a modern case, provide for 
                                                          
204. See Parrish, supra note 14, at 411 (describing the “glass house” concern that “Canada 
might successfully use legal rather than diplomatic means to punish U.S. polluters”); see also Let-
ter from Jack N. Gerard, President & CEO of the Nat’l Mining Ass’n, to Colin L. Powell, U.S. 
Sec’y of State, John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., & Michael O. Leavitt, Adm’r, U.S. EPA  
(Apr. 22, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gerard Letter] (arguing that the effects would be 
“devastating” if U.S. companies had to defend against allegation that their facilities and activities 
violated Canadian environmental laws).  
205. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas R. Kuhn, President of Edison Elec. Instit. to Colin L. 
Powell, U.S. Sec’y of State, & Thomas L. Sansonetti, Assistant Attorney Gen. for the Env’t & 
Natural Res. Div. (June 2, 2004) (“The unilateral EPA action raises the possibility of Canadian 
retaliation against our member companies and other U.S. industries whose emissions may cross 
the international border.”); Gerard Letter, supra note 204 (questioning the wisdom of pursuing a 
Canadian company under U.S. environmental laws and addressing the possibility that Canada and 
Mexico may pursue similar actions under their own respective domestic laws against U.S. com-
panies).  
206. Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in Sup-
port of Defendant-Appellant Supporting Reversal, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, 452 F.3d 
1066 (9th Cir. 2005); Brief for Amici Curiae the National Mining Ass’n & the National Ass’n of 
Manufacturers Supporting Appellant & Reversal, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, 452 F.3d 
1066 (9th Cir. 2005). 
207. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 45 (1955). For a dis-
cussion of the problem in a related context, see Benham, supra note 160, at 540–46. 
208. See, e.g., JAMIE CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW: LESSONS FROM BHOPAL 
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a damages remedy.209 But modern pollution problems involving less 
discernible pollutants from multiple sources—such as the SO2, VOCs, 
NOx, and PM2.5 that literally millions of polluters emit—are ill-fitted 
for traditional tort remedies.210  
A comparison of two cases, decided almost a century apart, unders-
cores the problem. In Missouri v. Illinois,211 the State of Missouri un-
successfully sought to enjoin Chicago from flushing its untreated se-
wage into the Des Plaines River.212 The Des Plaines River feeds into the 
Illinois River, which empties into the Mississippi River just forty-three 
miles upstream of St. Louis.213 A credible case was made that Chicago’s 
sewage contributed to a second typhoid outbreak in St. Louis.214 But the 
Court denied relief, noting that several other plausible explanations ex-
isted for the outbreak, and that therefore the plaintiff had failed to prove 
causation. This multiple-cause problem continues to create problems for 
recovery a hundred years later. Recently, the House of Lords grappled 
with the same sort of multiple cause issue in Fairchild v. Glenhaven 
Funeral Services.215 There, the court found it necessary to explain (in a 
long and convoluted way) why an asbestos worker, who died from the 
asbestos-related disease mesothelioma, was entitled to recover in tort 
against firms that had employed him in asbestos-related occupations. 
Incredibly, the United Kingdom’s highest court—some 40 years after 
the establishment of a link between asbestos and the lung disease meso-
thelioma216—had to overrule a lower court, which remarkably held that 
neither firm could be found liable.217 
Given the common law hurdles in recovering against multiple defen-
dants, modern environmental statutes have partially solved the problem. 
Those statutes imposed regulations that attempted, ex ante, to prevent 
                                                                                                                                      
69 (1993). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 78. For a discussion of these problems in the climate change context, see David A. 
Grossman, Warming up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22–33 (2003). For a similar discussion in the acid rain context, see Fisch-
er, supra note 121, at 449–50; Curtis Webb, Causation in Acid Rain Litigation: Facilitating Proof 
with Joint Liability Theories, 1983 BYU L. REV. 657, 657 (1983). 
211. 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
212. Id. at 517. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 524–25. 
215. [2002] U.K. H.L. 22. 
216. Id. at 43, para. 7. 
217. Id. at 40, para. 2. 
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harm, and also in some cases to provide an ex post remedy.218 In fact, 
modern environmental statutes emerged precisely because of the com-
mon law’s inability to deal with certain kinds of environmental harms. 
But, of course, these statutes only provided relief when legislatures spe-
cifically created a remedy. In the absence of a legislative response, re-
covery against multiple defendants—all of which could have but might 
not have caused the harm—has remained unlikely.219 
Yet a modern trend is emerging to counter this traditional bias against 
recovery from inchoate defendants.220 The increased use of statistical 
inferences in court proceedings and legislation suggest that courts are 
more receptive to finding causation than they once were. Again, two re-
cent cases are instructive. Agency for Health Care Administration v. As-
sociated Industries of Florida221 involved the application of a Florida 
statute, which enabled Florida to recover tobacco-related health care 
costs from tobacco manufacturers. The Florida Supreme Court upheld 
the use of a “market-share” theory of liability,222 permitting the plain-
tiffs to recover against the defendants based on the defendant’s market 
share in the tobacco products that likely led to illness.223 It further held 
that the use of statistical evidence in finding liability did not violate 
Florida’s constitution.224 A similar approach was also used recently by 
the province of British Columbia, which copied aspects of the Florida 
statute and then sought recovery against several foreign and Canadian 
tobacco makers. The British Columbia statute contained the same provi-
                                                          
218. For example, the most comprehensive environmental statute in the world, the U.S. Clean 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq., provides a myriad of interconnected programs aimed at reduc-
ing air pollution with the hope that it will obviate the need for litigation to solve air pollution dis-
putes. An ex post remedy exists in the Clean Air Act in the form of a citizen suit provision. See 42 
U.S.C. § 7604. 
219. The common law of nuisance, for example, one of the favored theories of environmental 
liability in the pre-statute era of environmental law, has not generally yielded success for envi-
ronmental plaintiffs. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illi-
nois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
220. Courts traditionally have been reluctant to accept statistical associations that epidemio-
logical studies produce as adequate evidence of specific causation. See generally Tom Christoffel 
& Stephen P. Teret, Epidemiology and the Law: Courts and Confidence Intervals, 81 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1661 (1991). 
221. 678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996). Significantly, the court stated in dicta that joint and several 
liability was also possible, although not as a concurrent theory with market-share liability. Id. at 
1255. 
222. Id. The seminal case upholding the theory of market share liability was Sindell v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d. 588 (1980). 
223. Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d at 1255–56. 
224. Id. at 1256. 
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sions for market-share liability and statistical evidence that were in the 
Florida statute. The British Columbia statute also had a provision that 
reversed the burden of proof in favor of the province.225 In British Co-
lumbia v. Imperial Tobacco, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the 
statute in all respects, including its extraterritorial application to the 
nonresident tobacco manufacturers.226 
This emerging trend in the use of statistical evidence—a key to the 
continued rise of market-share liability—comes just in time to support a 
theory of liability based on pollution contribution, or pollution share, 
which may be invoked to support a Canadian cause of action. Epidemio-
logical research over the past twenty years has yielded strong statistical 
links between certain types of air pollution and certain types of adverse 
human health effects (including premature death).227 As a result, Cana-
dian plaintiffs can now credibly argue that U.S. pollution emissions has 
led to some statistical “harm,” even if it those plaintiffs cannot show it 
was the specific U.S. defendant’s pollution that led to illness or death.228 
Air pollution modeling, monitoring, and reporting technologies proba-
bly are accurate enough to be admitted as evidence in court.229 At the 
very least, the science has advanced enough to serve as a legitimate ba-
sis for legislative and regulatory action.230 While the causal chain from 
                                                          
225. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, 2000 S.B.C. ch. 30, § 3(2) 
(Can.). The government must first prove, however, “on a balance of probabilities,” that the defen-
dant breached a common law duty to persons exposed to tobacco products, that exposure can 
cause or contribute to the disease, and that the tobacco product involved was sold in British Co-
lumbia by the defendant. Id. at § 3(1)(a)–(c). 
226. [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473 (Can.). 
227. Air pollution modeling has become sophisticated. Robert San Jose et al., Air Quality 
Modelling: State-of-the-Art (2006), available at http://www.iemss.org/iemss2006/papers/ 
w17/pp.pdf (providing a general discussion on current air quality modeling). 
228. For a discussion on the nature of harm in tort law and environmental law, see Albert C. 
Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 897 (2006). 
229. Certainly, monitoring and reporting technology, in place since the advent of the Acid 
Rain Program, has withstood any scrutiny without any substantial complaints of error. Modeling 
results, as well, satisfying the traditional statistical burden of a 90 or 95 percent level of confi-
dence, should not be a cause of concern for a fact-finder. See, e.g., ABT ASSOCIATES ET AL., THE 
PARTICULATE-RELATED HEALTH BENEFITS OF REDUCING POWER PLANT EMISSIONS, exhibits E-
1–E-3 (October 2000), available at http://cta.policy net/fact/mortality/mortalityabt.pdf (showing 
the 5, 50, and 95 percentiles); ABT ASSOCIATES ET AL., POWER PLANT EMISSIONS: PARTICULATE 
MATTER-RELATED HEALTH DAMAGES AND THE BENEFITS OF ALTERNATIVE EMISSION 
REDUCTION SCENARIOS, app. B (June 2004), available at 
http://www.cleartheair.org/dirtypower/docs/abt_powerplant_whitepaper.pdf, (indicating that 
tables show 5 and 95 percentile estimates) [hereinafter ABT ASSOCIATES ET AL., POWER PLANT 
EMISSIONS]. The results reported by Abt Associates indicate that there is a 90 percent chance that 
the “true” mean is between the 5 and 95 percentile estimates. 
230. See discussion of air quality modeling in EPA rulemakings, infra notes 236–44 and ac-
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pollution to adverse health outcome is not yet as firmly established as 
that for tobacco and lung diseases, conceptually, the differences be-
tween a tobacco lawsuit and an air pollution lawsuit have disappeared.  
Advances in pollution modeling sufficiently link pollution to health 
harms in several ways to overcome the traditional difficulties in proving 
causation. First, measuring the amount of pollution that a power plant 
emits has become relatively simple. Aided by reporting requirements, 
the EPA maintains a database that allows any user to find out how much 
pollution was emitted by a specific power plant emitted in a given year. 
The EPA’s eGRID database allows users to run individualized search 
queries by power plant, power plant owner, location, fuel type, and over 
a hundred other characteristics. Most importantly, the eGRID database 
provides information on emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur 
dioxide (SO2), carbon dioxide, and mercury.231 
Second, air quality models can now link pollution at the smokestack 
to pollution where the alleged health and environmental damages occur. 
Drawing largely on modeling efforts headed up by the EPA, Ontario 
agencies have developed a three-dimensional model that uses climato-
logical sub-models to track the movement of pollution for thousands of 
miles.232 In measuring pollution levels at the endpoint, these models in-
corporate the effects of a variety of meteorological data, such as clouds, 
seasonal variations in temperature and precipitation, and a variety of 
other factors.233 The Ontario Environment Ministry used the model to 
measure the effect of transboundary pollution by zeroing out pollution 
from Ontario sources and natural sources and imputing the rest to pollu-
tion emanating from the United States.234 
This linking is particularly robust with respect to SO2 and NOx emis-
sions from coal-fired power plants, which account for two-thirds of the 
total SO2 emissions and a quarter of the total NOx emissions in the 
United States.235 SO2 and NOx are particularly important not only as ac-
                                                                                                                                      
companying text. 
231. eGRID is available online at http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/egrid/index htm. 
232. A description of the model used by the EPA, the Community Multiscale Air Quality 
(CMAQ) Model, is available on the EPA website at 
http://www.epa.gov/asmdnerl/CMAQ/cmaq_model.html. 
233. Modeling Efforts To Evaluate Transboundary Influences and the Effects of Natural 
Sources on Ozone and PM2.5 Levels in Ontario, in PRELIMINARY APPLICATION AND 
EVALUATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE GUIDANCE DOCUMENT ON ACHIEVEMENT 
DETERMINATION FOR THE PM2 5 AND OZONE CANADA-WIDE STANDARDS 76–77 (2005).  
234. Id. at 77. 
235. This assertion is derived from data from the EPA’s annual National Emissions Inventory 
(NEI) Air Pollutant Emissions Trends Data reports on the emissions of the six criteria air pollu-
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id rain precursors, but also as precursors to the formation of deadly fine 
particulate matter,236 the air pollutant most responsible for premature 
deaths.237 Imputing a specific amount of pollution to certain specific 
coal-fired power plants, or to other polluting facilities, would now be a 
very feasible task for air quality modelers. Zeroing out the contributions 
of selected power plants and other emitters would produce estimates of 
the transboundary air pollution attributable to these facilities. The result 
would be the basis for Ontario’s health and environmental damage 
claims. Coal-fired power plants present a particularly easy mark because 
the ten largest parent company electricity generating companies emit 
fully half of the SO2 pollution.238 
One might wonder if such modeling results would constitute evi-
dence that is robust enough to be admissible in a court of law, and to 
form the basis for billions of dollars of damages. For the answer, one 
need look no further than EPA rulemakings. EPA’s highly controversial 
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR)239 requires upwind polluting states 
(mostly Midwestern and Southern) to reduce their emissions of SO2 and 
NOx in order to help downwind states (mostly Northeastern) reduce 
their ambient levels of ozone and particulate matter pollution. EPA orig-
inally announced the final rulemaking for CAIR on May 12, 2005,240 
following a public consultation period that spanned seventeen months 
from the original notice of proposed rulemaking,241 to the announce-
ment of the final rule. This consultation period involved the somewhat 
                                                                                                                                      
tants, which are available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/trends/. 
236. See, e.g., Rule To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone 
(Clean Air Interstate Rule): Reconsideration, 71 Fed. Reg. 25,304 (Apr. 28, 2006) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 96) [hereinafter Clean Air Interstate Rule]; ABT ASSOCIATES ET AL., POWER 
PLANT EMISSIONS, supra note 229, at 3-1; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, INC., EXPANDED EXPERT 
JUDGMENT ASSESSMENT OF THE CONCENTRATION-RESPONSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PM2 5 
EXPOSURE AND MORTALITY 3-14 to 3-15, 3-18 (Sept. 2006), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/tth/ecas/regdata/uncertainty/pm_ee_report.pdf. 
237. See Ontario Ministry of the Environment, What Are the Effects of Fine Particulate Mat-
ter?, http://www.airqualityontario.com/science/pollutants/particulates.cfm (last visited Sept. 1, 
2007) (“The greatest effect on health is from particles 2.5 microns or less in diameter. Exposure 
to fine particulate matter has been associated with hospital admissions and several serious health 
effects, including premature death.”). 
238. This assertion is derived from data from the eGrid database. See supra note 231 and ac-
companying text. 
239. Clean Air Interstate Rule, supra note 236. 
240. Rule To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air In-
terstate Rule): Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions to NOx SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 
(May 12, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 96). 
241. Rule To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air In-
terstate Rule), 69 Fed. Reg. 4,566 (Jan. 30, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96). 
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unusual step of EPA's making available the data, air quality model 
(CMAQ), and modeling results that formed the basis of the CAIR.242 
After receiving twelve petitions for reconsideration,243 however, EPA 
relented and emerged with the final rule in April 2006.244 Notably, EPA 
did not receive objections specific to the CMAQ model. CMAQ has 
been used in six other rulemakings.245 
Granted, the standards of evidence in a rulemaking are, in theory, 
supposed to be less stringent than the evidentiary standard in a court of 
law.246  In practice, however, given the high stakes involved in some 
rulemakings, the burden placed on administrative agencies is often as 
great, and perhaps greater, than that placed on a party to litigation.  In 
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute,247 the 
Court overturned a proposed Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) standard for benzene exposure, and held that “the bur-
den was on the Agency to show, on the basis of substantial evidence, 
that it is at least more likely than not that the long-term exposure to 10 
                                                          
242. Availability of Additional Information Supporting the Rule To Reduce Interstate Trans-
port of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule), 69 Fed. Reg. 47,828 (Aug. 
6, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 96). 
243. Clean Air Interstate Rule, supra note 236, at 25,305. 
244. Id. 
245. Proposed Rule, Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Locomotive Engines and 
Marine Compression-Ignition Engines Less Than 30 Liters Per Cylinder, 72 Fed. Reg. 15938-01 
(April 3, 2007) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 92, 94, 1033, 1039, 1042, 1065, 1068); Control of 
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources, 71 Fed. Reg. 15,804 (Mar. 29, 2006) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pts. 59, 80, 85, 86); Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the 
Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and the Re-
moval of Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units from the Section 112(c) 
List: Reconsideration, 70 Fed. Reg. 62,200, 62,204 (Oct. 28, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
63); Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; South Carolina and Geor-
gia; Attainment Demonstration for the Appalachian, Catawba, Pee Dee, Waccamaw, Santee 
Lynches, Berkeley-Charleston-Dorchester, Low Country, Lower Savannah, Central Midlands, 
and Upper Savannah Early Action Compact Areas, 70 Fed. Reg. 30,396, 30,401 (May 26, 2005) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52); Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation 
Plans; Tennessee and Georgia; Attainment Demonstrations for the Chattanooga, Nashville, and 
Tri-Cities Early Action Compact Areas, 70 Fed. Reg. 30,382, 30,385 (May 26, 2005) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52); Proposed National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; 
and, in the Alternative, Proposed Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary 
Sources, Electric Utility Steam Generating Units: Notice of Data Availability, 69 Fed. Reg. 
69,864, 69,873 (Dec. 1, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63). 
246. RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.5, at 464 (4th ed. 2002) 
("Courts often require agencies to provide some evidentiary support for the legislative facts that 
provide the predicates for agency rules, but courts should recognize that legislative facts are not 
susceptible to the kind of evidentiary proof routinely required to support findings of adjudicative 
facts."). 
247. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
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ppm of benzene presents a significant risk of material health impair-
ment.”248 It is now well-known history that this holding sent OSHA 
back to the drawing board for ten years, forced it to prepare a 36,000-
page record to support its benzene rule, and has profoundly changed 
administrative rulemaking.249  The CAIR, with its seventeen-month run-
up (not counting the previous Clinton administration attempts to ratchet 
down the standard), impacting the electric utility industry as much as it 
does, and pushing over 450 counties into non-attainment status,250 has 
been at least as hard-fought, not to mention the other rulemakings that 
have relied upon CMAQ, which have affected the electric utility indus-
try, the petroleum industry, the automotive and truck industries, the 
trucking industry, and the locomotive and marine industries.251  CMAQ 
has even supported a new rule limiting motor vehicle emissions of, of 
all things, benzene.252 
Appropriately, CMAQ remains under development. Since its intro-
duction in 1999, six new releases have been rolled out.253 A complex 
model that combines meteorological, emissions, physical, chemical, and 
even land use data and models, and provides interfaces for the several 
dozen submodels, is bound to be in a constant state of development. So, 
EPA has recognized that not only is waiting for the “kinks to be worked 
out” futile, but also that it would frustrate air quality objectives. As a 
peer review panel noted, “[t]he scientific content and performance of 
the CMAQ modeling system continues to improve with each release due 
to the excellent efforts of AMD staff. CMAQ…represents the state-of-
the-science of widely used models, particularly models that are used in a 
regulatory context.”254 CMAQ has already formed the basis for the for-
mulation of rules that will carry with them many billions of dollars of 
                                                          
248. See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 653 (emphasis added). 
249. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 
377–78 (4th ed. 2003). 
250. See Press Release, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, EPA Finalize Clean Air Inter-
state Rule (Mar. 16, 2005), available at 
http://www ncsl.org/programs/environ/air/EPAairrule htm.  
251. See supra note 245. 
252. See Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources, 71 Fed. Reg. 15,804 
(Mar. 29, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 59, 80, 85, 86).   
253. The Community Modeling and Analysis System website, maintained as a resource for 
modelers using CMAQ, contains documentation for CMAQ model versions 4.0 through 4.6., and 
is available at http://www.cmascenter.org/help/documentation.cfm?temp_id=99999. 
254. PRAVEEN AMAR ET AL., FINAL REPORT: SECOND PEER REVIEW OF THE CMAQ MODEL 
27 (July 2005), available at http://www.cmascenter.org/PDF/CMAQ_Scd_Peer_Rev_July_5.pdf. 
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compliance costs. CMAQ already has endured the most vigorous indus-
try challenges. 
C. Causation—Identifying the Plaintiffs 
The final traditional hurdle faced in attempting to hold U.S. polluters 
liable for transboundary pollution is for Ontario to identify the injured 
parties. Jurisprudential considerations generally require that a party al-
leging harm appear before the court. Among other reasons, knowing the 
plaintiff’s identity typically is essential to determine whether standing 
requirements have been met. 
Exceptions exist. Class action lawsuits permit the possibility of re-
covery when, prior to the initiation of the suit, there is known harm but 
not all of the harmed individuals can be identified.255 Indeed, the class 
action lawsuit is in part aimed at discovering the identity of the harmed 
individuals. While the notion of a class action lawsuit infringes upon 
some procedural norms, it is a mechanism that has been developed to 
address widespread harms that may not be easily remedied in a tradi-
tional model of litigation.256 For example, a large class of victims may 
suffer so small an injury that individual victims are unlikely to absorb 
the transaction costs of stepping forward to make a claim. Yet if the 
harm is serious enough, adjudication is considered appropriate, even if 
additional work is necessary to identify the victims.257 Thus, an effort to 
broadly notify possible plaintiffs of potential claims seems reasonable 
enough, along with a process to make claim filing relatively simple by 
opt-in. In such cases, the class action approach is necessary and worth-
while to provide a pared-down remedy, the alternative being no recov-
ery at all. Moreover, even if individual plaintiffs recover small amounts, 
the class action lawsuit recognizes that the aggregate harm can be quite 
large, and the importance of deterring future malfeasance great.258 
                                                          
255. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Bringing Shutts into the Future: Rethinking Protection of 
Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 585, 597–99 (2006); see also 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23. For comparisons between U.S. and Canadian class action procedures, see 
Vince Morabito, Defendant Class Actions and the Right To Opt Out: Lessons for Canada from 
the United States, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 197 (2004). 
256. Among other issues, there is the collective action problem faced by potential class action 
litigants: that one’s persons efforts to bring a suit produces positive externalities for other similar-
ly-situated litigants and therefore produces a free-rider problem. See, e.g., William B. Rubinstein, 
Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 
UMKC L. REV. 709, 710–12 (2006). 
257. Id. 
258. Id. 
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Similar considerations militate in favor of recovery for damages from 
air pollution. Unlike a class action lawsuit, however, the hypothetical 
Ontario lawsuit actually presents a clear plaintiff—the province of On-
tario, which has spent its health care resources caring for individuals 
harmed by air pollution, and has also suffered economic damages unre-
lated to adverse health outcomes. But Ontario would not be able to iden-
tify specific individuals that were harmed by air pollution. Rather, On-
tario would rely upon epidemiological evidence showing that a certain 
number of individuals in their population die from air pollution in any 
given period of time. In fact, an air pollution damages lawsuit presents 
questions very similar to lawsuits by states and provinces to recover 
damages suffered by its citizens in using tobacco products. In Agency 
for Health Care Administration v. Associated Industries of Florida259 
and British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco,260 the plaintiffs Florida and 
British Columbia alleged that some people, not necessarily named per-
sons, were harmed, sometimes fatally, by their use of tobacco products, 
and that the respective governments were also harmed in caring for or 
compensating these individuals. 
While such a cause of action may not exist in common law, Florida 
and many other U.S. states enacted state statutes to create a cause of ac-
tion and a remedy.261 In particular, U.S. states that made extensive Med-
icare payments drafted state statutes that explicitly provided a right of 
action for the state attorney general or some other official or agency to 
recover for the Medicare payments.262 It was thus Florida’s lead that 
British Columbia followed when its provincial parliament drafted a sta-
tute that explicitly provided a cause of action and a remedy for the prov-
ince for the health care costs the province absorbed in caring for those 
suffering from tobacco-related illness.263  
Certainly, creating a new cause of action by statute raised eyebrows. 
But it is important to draw upon the lessons of the round of tobacco liti-
gation: that new causes of action have often filled in the gaps in the law 
                                                          
259. 678 So. 2d 1239, 1257 (Fla. 1994).  
260. [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473 (Can.). 
261.  TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.033(d) (Vernon 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
118E, § 22 (2003); MINN. STAT. § 256B.37(1) (1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-4-112(3) 
(West 1973). 
262. The theory is one of subrogation, in which the state steps into the shoes of one having a 
cause of action which, in the tobacco context, means tobacco victims seeking to recover Medicaid 
payments. See supra note 261.  
263. Id.; see also Hall, supra note 115, at 68-72 (describing case); DeCoste, supra note 115, 
at 329–30 (describing case). 
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that have left very large and important harms unremedied. With the U.S. 
Congress failing abysmally to address perhaps the number one public 
health issue of this generation, litigation stepped in. Just as class action 
lawsuits represent an evolution in the law to deal with harms that the 
traditional model of litigation failed to remedy, the creation of causes of 
action to remedy tobacco-related harms and air pollution harms become 
viewed as not only acceptable fixes, but natural progressions of the law 
in adapting to the ever-changing nature of information. 
Solving the identifiable victim problem will require the marshalling 
of statistical evidence. In Associated Industries of Florida and Imperial 
Tobacco, statistical evidence was presented as to the number of victims 
of tobacco use for whom health care costs were incurred by Florida and 
British Columbia, respectively. In Associated Industries of Florida, the 
Florida Supreme Court, while upholding most aspects of the statute giv-
ing rise to the cause of action, struck down the provision that allowed 
Florida to only provide statistical evidence of the cost of making Medi-
care payments, and avoid identifying each individual recipient for 
whom recovery is sought.264 To do so, the court held, would violate due 
process guarantees under the Florida Constitution, by preventing defen-
dants from rebutting the statutorily-created presumption, and contesting 
the propriety of individual Medicare payments.265  
Canadian courts had no such trouble in Imperial Tobacco. The Brit-
ish Columbia statute provides, in language similar to the Florida statute, 
that “[i]f the government seeks in an action under subsection (1) to re-
cover the cost of health care benefits on an aggregate basis…it is not 
necessary…to identify particular individual insured persons…to prove 
the cause of tobacco related disease in any particular individual insured 
person, or…to prove the cost of health care benefits for any particular 
individual insured person….”266 The British Columbia statute does pro-
vide that the court “may order discovery of a statistically meaningful 
sample of the documents [that identify recipients]….”267 Finally, the 
statute provides that “[s]tatistical information and information derived 
from epidemiological, sociological and other relevant studies, including 
information derived from sampling, is admissible as evidence for the 
                                                          
264. 678 So. 2d at 1253–54. 
265. Id. 
266. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, 2000 S.B.C. ch. 30, § 2(5) 
(Can.). 
267. Id. at § 2(5)(d). 
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purposes of establishing causation and quantifying damages or the cost 
of health care benefits….”268 
The victim identifiability issue was briefed and argued at the trial 
court level, which held that the provision did not interfere with the in-
dependence of the judiciary, and would not necessarily prevent the de-
fendant from rebutting the statutory presumption.269 The Supreme Court 
of Canada, in upholding the British Columbia statute in all respects, did 
not even address the issue of identifying the victims of tobacco use, de-
spite an extended discussion of judicial independence and the “rule of 
law.”270 Whether this was a conscious or inadvertent omission on the 
part of the Court, it appears that the law of Canada would not preclude 
recovery on the basis of a statistical presentation of the victims of air 
pollution. 
Will a court have an open mind in hearing a transboundary air pollu-
tion case and grappling with the issue of the quality of statistical evi-
dence? Air pollution data, because of the nature of the statistical evi-
dence, cannot possibly identify the specific victims of air pollution. All 
that is known is that of a population dying prematurely from some lung 
ailment or cardiopulmonary disease, a certain percentage of those cases 
are likely to be due to air pollution, rather than smoking, hereditary rea-
sons, or other causes. And admittedly, the statistical case that air pollu-
tion leads to adverse health outcomes does not enjoy as long of a history 
of research as that linking tobacco use to lung disease. But if the Im-
perial Tobacco case is any indication, then Canadian courts are unlikely 
to be terribly concerned with the identifiability of victims of air pollu-
tion. 
Are these estimates ready for the rigor and scrutiny of litigation? On-
ly the courts can say for sure, but the epidemiological research linking 
adverse health outcomes to ambient concentrations of various pollutants 
has become highly credible science. By now, scores of studies have 
tracked fluctuations in pollution, primarily particulate matter, with 
health outcomes. Changes in health outcomes have been studied in the 
presence of events that change pollution levels, such as a strike at a lo-
cal steel mill,271 a ban on coal sales,272 and new restrictions on the sulfur 
content of fuel oil.273 
                                                          
268. Id. at § 5. 
269. British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., [2003] 227 D.L.R. (4th) 323 para. 27–90. 
270. Id. at para. 57–68. 
271. C. Arden Pope III et al., Daily Mortality and PM10 Pollution in Utah Valley, 47 
ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 211 (1992). 
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More signficantly, epidemiologists also have conducted other, more 
reliable, long-term time series studies, and even more reliable “cohort,” 
or panel data studies, which track the health outcomes of large groups of 
individuals over long time periods. Researchers carefully have scruti-
nized two studies in particular—one tracking over 500,000 people over 
seven years,274 and one tracking over 8000 people in six cities over 
fourteen to sixteen years (known as the “Harvard Six Cities Study”).275 
These studies found and measured a statistically significant relationship 
between long-term levels of particulate matter pollution and premature 
mortality. Because of their crucial findings, and because of the statistic-
al issues involved, a third-party consultant vetted the studies and sub-
jected them to a “reanalysis.” The independent consultant then pub-
lished a ninety-seven-page “condensed” report,276 which essentially 
corroborated the original researchers’ findings. The conclusions were 
compelling enough that the EPA in 1997 relied upon them heavily in 
setting a National Ambient Air Quality Standard for fine particulate 
matter.277 
The original Harvard Six Cities Study does not stand alone. Since the 
mid-1990s, dozens of new studies and follow-ups have been con-
ducted—including a follow-up to the Harvard Six Cities Study—further 
solidifying and quantifying the link between particulate matter and ad-
verse health outcomes.278 Of course, these studies statistically separated 
                                                                                                                                      
272. Luke Clancy et al., Effect of Air-Pollution Control on Death Rates in Dublin, Ireland: 
An Intervention Study, 360 LANCET 1210 (2002). 
273. Anthony Johnson Hedley et al., Cardiorespiratory and All-Cause Mortality After Re-
strictions on Sulphur Content of Fuel in Hong Kong: An Intervention Study, 360 LANCET 1646 
(2002). 
274. C. Arden Pope III et al., Particulate Air Pollution as a Predictor of Mortality in a Pros-
pective Study of U.S. Adults, 151 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 669 (1995). 
275. Douglas W. Dockery et al., An Association Between Air Pollution and Mortality in Six 
U.S. Cities, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753 (1993). 
276. HEALTH EFFECTS INSTITUTE, SPECIAL REPORT: REANALYSIS OF THE HARVARD SIX 
CITIES STUDY AND THE AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY STUDY OF PARTICULATE AIR POLLUTION 
AND MORTALITY (July 2000), available at http://pubs healtheffects.org/view.php?id=6. The Pub-
lic Statement to the Report stated that the “reanalyses assured the quality of the original data, rep-
licated the original results, and tested those results against alternative risk models and analytic 
approaches without substantively altering the original findings of an association between indica-
tors of particulate matter air pollution and mortality.” HEALTH EFFECTS INSTITUTE, SYNOPSIS OF 
THE PARTICLE EPIDEMIOLOGY REANALYSIS PROJECT iii-iv (2000), available at 
http://pubs healtheffects.org/view.php?id=6. In other words, the Health Effects Institute found the 
study to be accurate and reliable. 
277. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter: Proposed Decision, 61 
Fed. Reg. 65,638 (Dec. 13, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
278. See, e.g., Francine Laden et al., Reduction in Fine Particulate Air Pollution and Mortali-
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out the effects of air pollution from other potential causes, such as 
smoking, diet, exercise, and a variety of other factors that affect health 
outcomes. 
This epidemiological evidence is of a significantly higher quality 
than that which previously has been found wanting in litigation con-
texts.  In General Electric v. Joiner,279 the Supreme Court upheld a dis-
trict court's exclusion of expert testimony on the harmful effects of po-
lychlorinated biphenyls, or PCBs, which the plaintiff contended led to 
his lung cancer.280  In so doing, the Court applied a deferential "abuse of 
discretion" standard,281 but pointedly noted that the evidence (at that 
time) only involved animal studies, and other epidemiological studies 
that did not find a statistical link between PCBs and lung cancer.282  By 
comparison, the epidemiological studies that link particulate matter with 
adverse health outcomes are based on experiences with human subjects 
– obviously not experimental subjects, but those offering up their life 
and health as data – and have established highly statistically significant 
relationships.283  With statistical significance typically defined as a 95% 
probability,284 this kind of epidemiological evidence should be more 
than enough to pass judicial muster.  
Reports commissioned by the Ontario Medical Association (OMA) 
have drawn upon this literature to estimate the effects of air pollution on 
Ontarians. The OMA developed a special computer model, Illness Costs 
of Air Pollution (ICAP), which takes as inputs air quality and popula-
tion data, and calculates, using relationships derived in the air quality 
modeling and health effects literature, a projected number of premature 
deaths, hospital admissions, emergency room visits, and minor ill-
nesses.285 Originally developed to help Ontario perform cost-benefit 
analyses of various air pollution reduction strategies, ICAP has been 
                                                                                                                                      
ty: Extended Follow-up of the Harvard Six Cities Study, 173 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL 
CARE MED. 667 (2006); C. Arden Pope III et al., Lung Cancer, Cardiopulmonary Mortality, and 
Long-term Exposure to Fine Particulate Air Pollution, 287 JAMA 1132 (2002). For an extensive 
list of articles on air pollution and health effects, see DSS MGMT CONSULTANTS, PHASE II: 
ESTIMATING HEALTH AND ECONOMIC DAMAGES: ILLNESS COSTS OF AIR POLLUTION 54–64 (Ju-
ly 26, 2000) [hereinafter DSS Report]. 
279. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
280. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 139–40. 
281. Id. at 141. 
282. Id. at 143–46. 
283. See supra notes 274–276, 278. 
284. See, e.g., PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 69 (4th ed., 2003). 
285. ONT. MED. ASS’N, ILLNESS COSTS OF AIR POLLUTION, FINDINGS REPORT (June 2000), 
available at http://www.oma.org/phealth/icap htm#intro. 
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used more recently to estimate the contribution of different sources of 
pollution to the overall pollution problem. By varying the amount of 
pollution amount, different policy scenarios can be evaluated for their 
pollution effects and resulting costs. Similarly, by using the results of 
air quality models that measure the contributions of different individual 
air polluters, ICAP can estimate the damages that individual air pollu-
ters cause. ICAP incorporates a wide range of economic costs asso-
ciated with adverse health outcomes, such as the value of a lost life,286 
loss in economic productivity, direct health care costs, loss in quality of 
life, and risk of death. Despite the many categories of economic cost as-
sociated with adverse health outcomes, ICAP seems to err on the side of 
conservative estimates, going so far as to deduct health care costs for 
some cases where premature mortality enables Ontario to avoid caring 
for a person because of her death.287 
So are courts ready for epidemiological evidence of the link between 
air pollution and adverse (and for Ontario, costly) health outcomes? As 
in the case of evaluating air quality models as evidence, it is certainly 
noteworthy that this body of epidemiological research has survived the 
brutal EPA rulemaking process, withstanding the withering scrutiny of 
polluters that stand to lose billions of dollars from new pollution rules. 
It is also useful to remember that courts have in the past used statistical 
evidence to gauge damages. Securities litigation often relies heavily on 
statistical analysis to bolster assertions that some illicit trade yielded 
gains to the defendant, from alterations in the price.288 Antitrust litiga-
tion also often utilizes statistical analysis to show that market power ex-
ists289 or that prices are higher than they otherwise would be,290 thus aid-
ing in the measure of damages. 
As for the other economic costs of pollution, such as the environmen-
tal costs, they are apt to be far less contentious. Damages due to acid 
rain are easily distinguishable from other potential damages—the dis-
                                                          
286. An extensive literature exists on estimating the value of life for policy-making purposes. 
Often called the “value of a statistical life,” or “VSL,” the dollar value assigned to a life lost to 
pollution or some other risk is the most controversial aspect of cost-benefit analysis. Some esti-
mates of VSL are based on contingent valuation surveys, which query subjects how much they 
would be willing to pay to avoid certain risks of death. Other estimates of VSL are based upon 
risk premiums paid to workers in high-risk professions such as construction. 
287. DSS Report, supra note 278, at 22. 
288. Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and 
Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1025–1042 (1991) (describing 
the need for statistical event studies and how they are conducted). 
289. United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999). 
290. FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1076–78 (D.D.C. 1997). 
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tinct washing away and erosion of solid structures caused by acid rain is 
a unique identifying feature of this form of pollution. The unique black-
ening and erosion of statutes is an unfortunately clear sign of acid rain. 
The damages of such tangible structures are not trivial to measure, but 
they suffer no conceptual leaps as statistical analysis does. Similarly, 
damage to crops and forests by way of lost productivity is not a subject 
that economists will hotly contest. 
D. Other Possible Causes of Action for Ontario 
If Ontario chose not to enact a statute, there would be some plausible 
common law causes of action that could provide a remedy for trans-
boundary air pollution. Public nuisance has emerged as one of the more 
promising theories in “public tort” lawsuits291 seeking relief against de-
fendants that are associated with widespread harms, similar to those 
caused by pollution. Plaintiffs have advanced public nuisance as a 
theory of recovery in lawsuits against handgun manufacturers and dis-
tributors,292 lead paint manufacturers,293 electric utilities (for carbon 
dioxide emissions),294 and automobile manufacturers (also for carbon 
dioxide emissions).295 To date, the results have been mixed, with courts 
showing some reluctance to impose liability for the manufacture of law-
ful products,296 and where, in the case of handguns and automobiles, 
there are intervening third party causes of harm other than the manufac-
turer.297 At the same time, courts have been willing to move away from 
traditional doctrinal restrictions that limit recovery to noxious land uses 
and preclude recovery against activities that are heavily regulated and 
conducted legally.298 
                                                          
291. Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?, 77 
TEMPLE L. REV. 825 (2004). 
292. See, e.g., Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1232 (Ind. 2003); James v. Arms 
Tech. Inc., 820 A.2d. 27, 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); Cincinnati v. Beretta USA Corp., 
768 N.E. 2d 1136, 1140 (Ohio 2002). 
293. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Lead Indus., No. PB 99-5226, 2004 WL 1542236 (R.I. Super. 
Ct. July 2, 2004); Milwaukee v. NL Industries, 691 N.W.2d. 888, 890–91 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004); 
cf. Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid, 823 N.E.2d. 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
294. See, e.g., Complaint, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (No. 04 Civ. 5669). 
295. See, e.g., Complaint, California v. Gen. Motors Corp. (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2006) (No. 
3:06-CV-05755), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts. 
296. See Ausness, supra note 291, at 871–72. 
297. Id. at 874–75. 
298. See., e.g., supra note 292. 
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Public nuisance, invoked in several early air pollution cases,299 would 
seem to be a candidate theory for redressing Ontario's transboundary air 
pollution problem. The Restatement of Torts standard for recovery, an 
intentional and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of 
land,300 contemplates that some balancing between the gravity of harm 
and the utility of defendant's conduct determine whether the interference 
is “unreasonable.”301 Liability for air pollution almost always has in-
volved activities that are productive and legal, so the legality of defen-
dants' activity, by itself, would not preclude a finding of unreasonable-
ness.302 And the formulation of the balancing test has evolved over time, 
such that the plethora of pollution reduction measures and alternative 
electricity generating sources could weigh in favor of a finding of un-
reasonableness.303 Modern evidence of the link between air pollution 
and adverse health outcomes may solidify the finding that the gravity of 
the harm outweighs the utility of the defendants' conduct.304 
One potential problem with utilizing a nuisance theory to recover for 
this kind of air pollution, however, is that it typically requires that indi-
vidual defendants to a nuisance suit be substantial contributors to the air 
pollution problem. In a "pollution share" suit similar to the Sindell v. 
Abbott "market share" suit,305 liability would require that enough defen-
dants be bundled together to form a "substantial" contribution, possibly 
more than 50%, on the theory that recovery requires meeting the "more 
likely than not" standard.306 This requirement certainly would make it 
difficult to hold electric utilities liable for greenhouse gas emissions, 
and for fine particulate matter might complicate a prospective suit by 
Ontario to recoup air pollution costs. 
                                                          
299.  Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 
U.S. 230 (1907); Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970); Madison v. Duck-
town Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904).    
300. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979). 
301. Id. at § 826(a). 
302. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS  § 88, at 629 (5th ed., 1984) 
[hereinafter KEETON 1984] (“Thus an industrial enterpriser who properly locates a cement plant 
or a coal-burning electric generator, who exercises utmost care in the utilization of known scien-
tific techniques for minimizing the harm from the emission of noxious smoke, dust and gas and 
who is serving society well by engaging in the activity may yet be required to pay for the inevita-
ble harm caused to neighbors.”). Even environmental permits may not insulate polluters from a 
nuisance suit. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 88 A, at 87 (5th ed. 
Supp. 1988). 
303. KEETON 1984, supra note 302, § 88, at 627. 
304. Id. § 88, at 626. 
305. See supra, notes 222–227 and accompanying text. 
306. KEETON 1984, supra note 302, § 103, at 714. 
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What about a theory of parens patriae, a suit to protect its citizens, as 
was done in the landmark air pollution case Georgia v. Tennessee Cop-
per?307 Parens patriae has often involved “quasi-sovereign” interests,308 
so the abatement of air and water pollution that harms a province's citi-
zens, and costs a province money, would seem to call for parens pa-
triae.309 The Canadian Supreme Court has looked favorably upon pa-
rens patriae as a means of sovereigns recovering for the loss of Crown 
goods and property.310 But a traditional limitation on parens patriae has 
been that most cases have targeted behavior that was either tortious or 
illegal.311 And a traditional limitation on parens patriae is such that it 
provides a mechanism for standing, but not a new substantive cause of 
action.312 
Common law tort doctrines always have evolved to fit the changing 
realities of litigation.  It is certainly quite possible that a Canadian court 
would expansively interpret various tort theories to support an Ontario 
suit over transboundary air pollution.  But environmental harms tradi-
tionally have found traditional tort suits ill-fitting.313  And the scientific 
and technical advances that would support a statutorily-created cause of 
action may or may or may not solve all of the obstacles to invoking tra-
ditional tort causes of action. 
Jurisprudential considerations call for some caution when allowing 
lawsuits to go forward without actually having a named, identified vic-
tim or plaintiff in court. But the nature of many modern injuries, espe-
cially environmental ones, is such that the harm can be certain although 
unsusceptible of a precise location or effect in an individual case. Courts 
have adapted to these modern realities in the past, by allowing class ac-
                                                          
307. 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
308. See, e.g., State v. Dover, 891 A.2d 524, 528–29 (N.H. 2006); cf. Estados Unidos Mex-
icanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 336 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The [U.S.] Supreme Court has never rec-
ognized parens patriae standing in a foreign nation where only quasi-sovereign interests are at 
stake. The justifications offered to support parens patriae standing in the individual States of the 
Union are not applicable here.”). 
309. See, e.g., EPA v. Green Forest, 921 F.2d 1394, 1404 (8th Cir. 1990); Burch v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 420 F. Supp. 82, 86 (D. Md. 1976) (“The state's interest as parens patriae is 
most evident when it seeks to preserve its natural resources, or when it asks protection for the 
health of its citizens.”) (citations omitted). 
310. British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 74, para. 9, 76 (Can.). 
311. See Ausness, supra note 291, at 861–62. 
312. Id. 
313. See, e.g., Noah Hall, Political Externalities, Federalism, and a Proposal for an Inter-
state Environmental Assessment Policy (Wayne State Univ. Law Sch. Research Paper No. 07-20, 
2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=982929.  
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tion lawsuits, for example. Allowing recovery in environmental cases is 
a logical continuation of this trend. 
Only a short time ago, a domestic solution to a transboundary pollu-
tion problem would have seemed problematic from both a jurispruden-
tial and an international perspective. The consciously extraterritorial ap-
plication of domestic law was, until recently, a relatively rare 
occurrence. But the pace of globalization seems to be straining the lim-
its of traditional mechanisms of resolving transnational disputes. At the 
same time, science and technology finally seem to be catching up in 
terms of monitoring complex environmental harms. While these new 
tools are applied most often in the regulatory context, they have become 
robust enough to be applied in a litigation context, and could support a 
lawsuit that in the past would have been foiled by traditional evidentiary 
obstacles. As a descriptive matter, the time is ripe for a jurisdiction like 
Ontario to piece together the various pieces of the puzzle that would 
form the basis of a domestic lawsuit that remedies transboundary pollu-
tion.  Whether such an approach is a normatively positive development, 
we briefly explore below. 
 
IV. THE VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING THROUGH 
DOMESTIC LITIGATION 
While this Article predicts that Canadians may choose to embrace 
transnational civil litigation, what are the broader implications for inter-
national law? Is the growth of transnational civil litigation, instead of a 
bilateralism, a positive development?314 Consistent with the authors’ 
earlier scholarly work,315 transnational litigation is not an ideal solution 
to transboundary problems—but it may be the only viable option pre-
sently available, and does serve some important functions. 
Throughout the history of environmental law, litigation has served an 
important function in terms of animating subsequent negotiations and 
political developments by potentially changing the baseline rules. By 
introducing some uncertainty with respect to the default outcome, litiga-
                                                          
314. Treaties on international civil liability seek to establish tort remedies for international 
harms, but have suffered chronic weakness due to a number of political and jurisprudential prob-
lems. Noah Sachs, Beyond the Liability Wall: Strengthening Tort Remedies in International Envi-
ronmental Law (unpublished manuscript),  available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=noah_sachs. 
315. See, e.g., Parrish, supra note 14; Parrish, supra note 15. 
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tion has often cast a long shadow over post-litigation bargaining. For 
example, the landmark case TVA v. Hill316 sent shock waves throughout 
the environmental community by holding that the Endangered Species 
Act did, in fact, bar completion of a dam that would wipe out the last 
known habitat of a fish species listed under the Act. The unexpected rul-
ing plays a central part of the lore of environmental law, as it dramati-
cally changed the landscape of land use regulation, and has played a 
prominent role in animating subsequent regulatory bargaining situa-
tions.317 Also, in City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,318 the 
Court held that the ash generated by a waste combustion facility (which 
the City of Chicago operated), was subject to the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act. The holding led to a "flurry" of activity at EPA 
and in Congress.  The decision also grabbed the attention of municipal 
waste incinerator operators, who suddenly were facing civil and crimi-
nal liability simply for operating their facilities as they always had. 
Stuck in the middle of hostilities between the municipalities with waste 
incinerators and environmental organizations, EPA wrote new regula-
tions charting a middle course.  Although environmentalists roundly 
criticized them, there was no doubt that the new regulations would not 
have been implemented but for the Supreme Court decision.319  
Transboundary litigation may serve the same purpose in an interna-
tional context, serving as a catalyst for bilateral negotiations. A Cana-
dian embrace of extraterritorial reciprocity could spur U.S. policy-
makers to once again meaningfully engage with bilateralism.320 Even 
though the Bush Administration's disengagement may have nothing to 
do with Canada and everything to do with its environmental agenda, a 
transboundary lawsuit would certainly grab the attention of environmen-
                                                          
316. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
317. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game-theoretic Approach to Regulatory Negotiation and a 
Framework for Empirical Analysis, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 33 (2002). 
318. 511 U.S. 328 (1994). 
319. See Richard J. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of Chicago v. Environmental De-
fense Fund: Searching for Plain Meaning in Unambiguous Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 
(1995). 
320. Cf. DANIEL RIESEL, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 1.06, at 
1-28.9 (2007) (noting how environmental citizen suits in the 1970s and 1980s prompted “an in-
creased sensitivity to enforcement by the various state environmental agencies”); Randall S. Ab-
ate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the Piecemeal Approach to Climate 
Change Regulation in the United States, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 369, 398 (2006) (noting 
that “though the outcomes of [private environmental citizen] suits were often more symbolic than 
substantive, these court victories prompted state agencies to consider and regulate environmental 
concerns more actively”). 
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tal policy-makers and cause them to consider re-ordering environmental 
priorities.  
Climate change litigation may well serve this role.321 With the U.S. 
and Australia refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, with Canada refus-
ing to attempt to meet the Kyoto targets despite having ratified the Pro-
tocol, and with China and India, the second- and fourth-largest emitters 
of carbon dioxide322 there are mounting doubts that Kyoto will accom-
plish even its modest goals.323 What then? One hopes that efforts on the 
state and local levels will achieve some measure of success,324 particu-
                                                          
321. See, e.g., David A. Grossman, Warming up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Cli-
mate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003) (describing climate change litigation 
to address certain harms as an alternative when political action fails); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Acts 
of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort Principles to the Problem of Climate Change, 38 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 563 (1998) (arguing that tort litigation could effectively address climate change 
harm); see also Abate, supra note 320, at 373 (arguing “that climate change litigation is a more 
effective tool to bring about a mandatory federal regulatory program than are legislative efforts at 
the state, regional, and city levels, or voluntary initiatives within the regulated community”). 
322. Preliminary estimates by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency indicate 
that China surpassed the United States in total carbon dioxide emissions in 2006, due in large part 
to China's increase in coal consumption and rapid industrialization.  Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency, China Now No. 1 in CO2 Emissions, USA in Second Position, 
http://www mnp nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/moreinfo/Chinanowno1inCO2emissionsUSAinsec
ondposition html (last visited Sept. 6, 2007). Wikipedia contains a list of countries by carbon dio-
xide emissions, listing India as fourth in 2003 emissions. Wikipedia, List of Countries by Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_carbon_dioxide_emissions 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2007).  
323. As a normative matter, most people outside of the Bush Administration and Australia’s 
Howard Administration are certainly hoping for Kyoto to provide effective governance. As the 
number of countries experiencing difficulty in meeting their targets increase, however, and as 
Kyoto signatories begin to signal that they have given up hope of meeting their targets, one won-
ders if there is any hope for Kyoto. See, e.g., Expectations Low as Kyoto Parties Meet To Chart 
Long-term Strategy, GREENWIRE, Nov. 28, 2005 (on file with author). In 2005, New Zealand 
dropped plans for a carbon tax because it would have increased electricity and fossil fuel prices 
too much to justify the decrease in emissions. New Zealand Scraps Kyoto Carbon-Tax Plan, 
PLANET ARK, Dec. 22, 2005, available at 
http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/34180/story htm. In the most Kyoto-
enthusiastic region of the world, Europe, the majority of EU members failed to submit their 
greenhouse gas emissions allocation plans on time as required by the EU. See More Than Half of 
E.U. Nations Miss Deadline for New Emissions Plans, GREENWIRE, July 5, 2006 (on file with 
author); Netherlands to Cut Emissions Quota; 14 Others Lag Behind, GREENWIRE, Sept. 6, 2006 
(on file with author). Trying to protect the competitiveness of its industries from American com-
petition that does not worry about greenhouse gas regulation, Canada also effectively dropped out 
of efforts to comply with Kyoto. Enviros Threaten to Sue Canada to Adhere to Kyoto, 
GREENWIRE, Oct. 31, 2006 (on file with author). 
324. See supra note 13 for an in-depth discussion of these issues; see also Laura Kosloff & 
Mark Trexler, State Climate Change Initiatives: Think Locally, Act Globally, NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T, Spring 2004, at  46 (2004) (describing state and local attempts to address climate change); 
Hari M. Osofsky, Local Approaches to Transnational Corporate Responsibility: Mapping the 
60 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 48:1 
 
 
larly given that some scholars believe subnational and nonstate actors 
are more adept at solving environmental problems than states using tra-
ditional sources of international law.325 But if international climate dip-
lomacy continues to appear cumbersome and feckless, litigation may be 
an appropriate tool for bringing the parties back to the bargaining table. 
For example, just starting a conversation about damages326 for climate 
change would affect the relative bargaining positions of the many key 
climate stakeholders.  
A second function of litigation may be to focus attention on the 
transboundary air pollution problem, possibly changing the political dy-
namics with a view to, again, change the default outcomes.327 Private 
party litigation can serve the important function of “focusing attention 
upon the problem and providing relief to those persons who have suf-
fered.”328 Even if a judgment proves ultimately uncollectible, the use of 
Canadian domestic laws to address a transboundary environmental 
problem may create a mindset, over time, among lawyers and policy-
makers that the extraterritorial application of domestic law is an accept-
able way of focusing attention on a transboundary problem.329 
Litigation always has filled gaps left open by institutions of first 
resort.330 When the executive and legislative branches have dithered and 
have failed to address significant public health and environmental 
                                                                                                                                      
Role of Subnational Climate Change Litigation, 20 GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. (forthcoming 
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=980105 (listing literature on subnational cli-
mate change initiatives); Barry G. Rabe, North American Federalism and Climate Change Poli-
cy: American State and Canadian Provincial Policy Development, 14 WIDENER L.J. 121 (2004) 
(describing subnational attempts to address climate change in the U.S.-Canada context). 
325. See, e.g., Bradley Karkkainen, Marine Ecosystem Management & a “Post-Sovereign” 
Transboundary Governance, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 113, 114 (2004) (arguing for “novel multi-
party regional collaborative governance arrangements that include sub-national and non-state ac-
tors”). 
326. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change (Univ. 
of Cal., Berkeley, Public Law Research Paper No. 954357, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=954357. 
327. Cf. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy,  FOREIGN AFF. Sept. –
Oct. 2000, at 102, 106 (2000) (stating that the principal benefit in human rights litigation under 
the Alien Tort Claims Act may be “the public attention they generate”). 
328. Benham, supra note 160, at 546. 
329. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Dialectical Regulation, Territoriality, and Pluralism, 38 
CONN. L. REV. 929, 945 (2006) (arguing that “the mere assertion of jurisdiction and articulation 
of a norm (even without literal enforcement power) has such great impact that it effectively alters 
legal consciousness”) [hereinafter Berman, Dialectical Regulation]; Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing 
Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2006) (reviewing JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)). 
330. See supra note 291. 
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harms, public tort litigation often has stepped into the breach (albeit not 
always successfully). The very purpose behind environmental citizen 
suit provisions in domestic law, for example, is to encourage private at-
torneys general to pursue such actions.331 At the very least, “[l]itigation 
may provide interim relief until [more] comprehensive solution[s]” to 
environmental challenges are found.332 And, from an environmental 
perspective, doing something is better than doing nothing.333 
This is not to say that we endorse domestic extraterritorial litigation 
as a long-term sustainable approach to addressing transboundary prob-
lems. For one thing, domestic extraterritorial litigation could lead to a 
patchwork of inconsistent adjudications as different courts from both 
sides of the border will approach cross-border issues using different 
laws.334 A hodgepodge of different judgments and policies could create 
unpredictability for businesses and industry.335 Second, whether the 
courts are friendly to environmental issues is unclear.336 Even with the 
                                                          
331. See generally Edward Lloyd, Citizen Suits and Defenses Against Them, 101 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 885 (2004) (providing a statistical overview of environmental citizen suits); James R. 
May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1 
(2003) (surveying the impact of citizen suits); Kristi M. Smith, Who’s Suing Whom?: A Compari-
son of Government and Citizen Suit Environmental Enforcement Actions Brought Under EPA-
Administered Statutes, 1995-2000, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 359, 395–96 (2004) (arguing that sta-
tistics demonstrate that citizen’s suits are intended to “spur and supplement government enforce-
ment actions”). 
332. Wooley, supra note 114, at 139. 
333. The Prevention Principle underscores the rationale behind this contention. “Preventing 
environmental damage is almost always less costly than allowing the damage and incurring the 
environmental costs and other consequences later.” HUNTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 404; see 
also Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment prin. 6, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1972) (declaring that the release of substances that cause serious 
environmental damage “must be halted in order to ensure that serious or irreversible damage is 
not inflicted upon ecosystems”). 
334. For a discussion of how litigation can lead to patchwork solutions, see Paul L. Langer, 
Significant Current Developments in Environmental Insurance Coverage, 690 PLI/Comm. 129, 
131 (1994) (describing how a “litigation explosion” over the insurance coverage aspects of envi-
ronmental liability has led to a “patchwork of inconsistent and often conflicting decisions”); cf. 
Abate, supra note 320, at 385 (noting that a drawback to climate change litigation may be the pat-
chwork, rather than comprehensive, nature of litigation solutions); Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of 
Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian Democracy, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 471–80 (2000) (de-
scribing the problems of the patchwork solutions caused by mass tort litigation and calling for 
national standards). 
335. Cf. PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE ACTIVITIES IN THE 
U.S. 2004 UPDATE (2004), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/ 
us_activities_2004.cfm (describing how local climate change initiatives could create patchwork 
regulation leading to inefficiency and unpredictability). 
336. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Su-
preme Court’s Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 346 (1989) (describing 
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changes in law and science described above, litigants might find judges 
reluctant to hear these kind of cases. Finally, even if the courts are will-
ing to tackle the complex environmental issues, the foreign and political 
nature of transboundary pollution poses unique challenges– the lawsuits 
would be complex, time-consuming, and costly both for the litigants and 
the courts.337 
And these concerns do not even reach the bigger conceptual prob-
lems, such as the undemocratic nature of extraterritorially applying do-
mestic laws,338 or the likely responses, such as diplomatic protests,339 
nonrecognition of judgments,340 or the enactment of blocking341 or 
claw-back statutes.342 
But these issues can be left aside for now.  Litigation as a means of 
settling and resettling default positions currently is an important part of 
international lawmaking. Just as litigation has been able to  change the 
assumptions regarding the legal order with respect to environmental 
matters in the United States, it has the potential in the international 
realm to redeal the hands that have been dealt various stakeholders, and 
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1668 (1997) (arguing that courts are poorly equipped to address questions involving foreign rela-
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in the end bring about more cooperative outcomes. In the context of the 
Canada-U.S. relationship, it has the potential to bring the parties back 
together, hopefully with a renewed focus on bilateral cooperation.  Ca-
nadians would be wise to consider this litigation option. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In recent years, environmental and international legal theorists have 
cheered the growth of extraterritorial domestic litigation as a method of 
addressing transboundary disputes. This growth is intimately connected 
with the changing nature of international law and relations, including 
the important role that non-state actors now play in the international 
arena. Largely ignored, however, is how these changes are developing 
outside the United States, in a way that impact American interests. As a 
result of America’s embrace of extraterritoriality and the United States 
retreat from bilateralism, Canadians increasingly will explore the use of 
their own domestic laws to resolve transboundary air pollution emanat-
ing from the United States. Changes in law and science make such law-
suits possible, and extraterritorial reciprocity may, for the first time, be a 
very real threat. By itself, such litigation would be nothing to celebrate, 
but insofar as it would over time re-engage the parties to this historically 
harmonious relationship in bilateralism, it would represent a welcome 
shift in international lawmaking. 
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